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ABSTRACT
In the past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR) programs have been
implemented to combat the economic and environmental costs of automobile
dependent societies. Seventy-five such programs have been implemented
worldwide since 1990. This thesis examines correlations among factors affecting
program performance, the relationship of articulated program objectives to
program performance, and how factors affecting program performance
influence environmental concerns. Employing a mixed methodology, this
analysis answers how an accelerated vehicle retirement program can be
designed to maximize desired outcomes and minimize undesirable outcomes.
The results of this analysis demonstrate that the order and type of objective
stipulated by a program will influence a program’s performance, and that
relationships among factors affecting program performance can dictate how
well a program will function. The framework created from the literature review
and from program analysis can apprise planners on how to most effectively
design future AVR programs.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the economic and ecological costs of motoring, people in developed
nations continue to hold private vehicles as their primary tool for mobility.
Planners and policymakers alike must develop systems to cope with the
peripheral consequences of an auto-dependent society. Consequences include
national security concerns stemming from increased dependence on foreign oil
suppliers, and detriments to air quality as a result of vehicle emissions. If
people must commute via automobile, what policy implementations can reduce
the economic and environmental costs of automobile operation?

One proposed solution for correcting ills generated from an auto-dependent
society is accelerated vehicle retirement (AVR). In the past, AVR programs have
been introduced as mechanisms to remedy a number of economic and
environmental dilemmas instigated by a disproportionate amount of older
vehicles utilized in a particular locale. AVR programs have been conducted both
domestically and internationally at various scales. Set off in 1990, roughly fifty
AVR programs have been introduced in the past twenty years. The U.S. federal
government executed the most recent AVR program in July and August of 2009.
The Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS), or “Cash for Clunkers,”
program offered consumers a monetary reward ($3,500 or $4,500) for trading in
an older vehicle for a more fuel-efficient new vehicle. The CARS program
dictated two broad objectives: to aid in an already expansive economic
recovery effort by providing monetary stimulus through the increased sale of
new automobiles, and to ameliorate past environmental harms caused by older
gas-guzzling vehicles via the substitution of new fuel-efficient models. The
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debate concerning the degree to which either objective was accomplished
persists.

While, vehicle retirement programs present an attractive method for
expeditiously modifying entire vehicle fleets, objectives vary across various
vehicle retirement programs, as do notions concerning the most optimal
approach for execution. AVR implementation has occurred at various national
and urban scales; the motivations behind such programs vary significantly.
Design of AVR programs has not been methodical, and thus evaluation of such
programs is neither objective nor able to account for diverse outcomes resulting
from an AVR program’s implementation. As evaluation is an essential part of
government planning, given the lack of an accepted framework for designing an
AVR program, this research has considered how various AVR objectives might
be characterized to aid in the creation of a framework and performancemonitoring program for evaluating future AVR programs.

The objectives of this research are to create a framework for designing an
advanced vehicle retirement program according to varying scales and
objectives and to develop a performance-monitoring program that accounts for
both intended and undesirable consequences of an AVR program. To realize
the objectives, a literature review has been conducted that examines
motivations behind the implementation of an AVR program.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A review of the literature was conducted on the motivations, theories, and
structure of past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR) programs. The literature
review examines acknowledged economic and environmental aspects of AVR
programs, and details past occurrences of AVR. Scrutinizing past motivations
and program structures allows for the formation of an AVR knowledge base and
permits for more accurate analysis.

Motivations
Older vehicles are disproportionately responsible for the bulk of vehicle
emissions, and contribute excessively to air pollution in urban areas (Dill 2004
22, EPA 1993 Section III, Hahn 1995 223, U.S. OTA 1992 1, Shaheen et. al. 1994
220). Natural vehicle attrition rates, coalesced with improved vehicle
technology, regulatory standards for vehicle emissions, and increased vehicle
replacement as a result of heightened sales during sustained periods of
economic stability correct the emissions consequence for a great number of
vehicles. The effects of these combined factors are not immediate; vehicle fleet
turnover is a gradual progression (ECMT 1999 3) Accelerated Vehicle
Retirement (AVR,) alternatively identified as vehicle scrappage, cash-for-

clunkers, or fleet renewal can be a catalyst for hastening the total vehicle fleet
turnover rate. A number of national and state governments, as well as private
corporations, have implemented AVR programs throughout the past two
decades.
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Policymakers employ incentive-based AVR programs for the purpose of
achieving various social, economic, and environmental targets, of which there
are often multiple goals (Mapako, 2010, 1). AVR program objectives might
include:
1. the stimulation of a national economy through new car sales
2. the reduction of vehicular emissions
3. the improvement of vehicle safety
4. the prevention of vehicle abandonment, or
5. the curtailing of consumer spending on gasoline (Allen et al. 2009 1,
ECMT 1999 7, Mapako 2010 1).

A total vehicle fleet fuel consumption reduction might also result when an AVR
program spawns the sale of new fuel-efficient vehicles (Evans 2008 66).
Accordingly, rationale for AVR program implementation can be motivated by
economic or environmental objectives – and, is regularly a combination of the
two.

Environmental Motivations
The allure of AVR as a medium to achieve environmental resolutions has
sustained as vehicle scrappage presents an economical strategy for the
removal of older vehicles not outfitted to cope with pollutant control measures
stipulated by increasingly stringent mobile emissions and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. As older vehicles often lack technologically
advanced emissions control systems, or faulty emissions control systems due to
mechanical failure, vehicle fleet renewal can decrease the amount of older
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vehicles in operation and “substantially curb atmospheric pollution” (ECMT 199
27). Mobile emissions standards strive to rein in pollution criterions that originate
from a vehicle’s direct tailpipe emissions, as well as mechanical deterioration of
vehicle components. Dominant vehicle emissions contain carbon monoxide,
hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, lead and particulate matter (AMS 1999). A
succession of United States federal policies has endeavored to regulate mobile
emissions, and lead to a federal stance toward AVR in 1993.

California
Regulatory actions in the state of California have preceded federal policy on a
number of occasions, and often-pilot federal behavior. In 1959, California’s State
Department of Public Health was tasked state statute to establish air quality
standards as well as motor vehicle emissions controls (Hanemann 2008 121).
The air quality standards were the first of their kind enacted in the United States.
Table 1 details California’s early regulatory action centered on emissions
control:
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Table 1: Early California Emissions Control Actions

Year Action
1960

Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board created to test, certify, distribute
and install emissions control devices on vehicles sold in California.

State Department of Public Health introduced the nation’s first emissions
1961 controls, ordering positive crankcase ventilation on new vehicles sold in
California beginning in 1963
Motor Vehicle Control Board set tailpipe emissions standards for both
1964
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide beginning in 1966
California Highway Patrol began random inspections of vehicle smog
1966
control devices.
California Air Resources Board (CARB) was created, to “To promote and
protect public health, welfare and ecological resources through the
1967
effective and efficient reduction of air pollutants while recognizing and
considering the effects on the economy of the state” (CARB 2009).
(Hanemann 2008 121)

Precedents set by early California regulatory actions have allowed the state to
recurrently formulate emissions control legislation in advance of the federal
government. Consequently, the nation’s first AVR program, the Southern
California Retired Automobile Program (SCRAP) was conducted by UNOCAL in
the Los Angeles Air Basin in 1990 (Shaheen et. al. 1994 220).

The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955
Attempts to regulate air pollution by U.S. cities date back to the early 19th
century. Air quality regulations were passed in 1815 by the city of Pittsburgh,
and subsequently smoke control ordinances were ratified by both Cincinnati
and Chicago (West 2005). Twenty-three U.S. cities approved air quality laws
concerning smoke control by 1912 (West 2005). Following almost 150 years of
allowing both state and local governments to enact often-divergent air quality
regulations, the U.S. Congress passed the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 to
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manage air pollution on a national scale (AMS 1999). The Air Pollution Control
Act did little more than publicize the fact that air quality was a nationalized
concern, and provided research funding to that end. Amended twice, in both
1960 and 1962, the 1962 amendments instructed the U.S. Surgeon General to
“determine the health effects of various motor vehicle exhaust substances”
(AMS 1999).

The Clean Air Act of 1963
The Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1963 substantially increased funding to state and
local governments intended for air quality research and the formation of air
pollution control measures. Centered on research of motor vehicle emissions
instructed by the Air Pollution and Control Act Amendments of 1962, the CAA of
1963 advanced the idea that emissions standards could be advantageous for
motor vehicles (AMS 1999). The Clean Air Act of 1963 was amended each year
1965-1967, as well as 1969. The 1965 amendments, dubbed the “Motor Vehicle
Pollution Control Act,” required the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to develop emissions standards for new vehicles – 6 years after
California lawmakers had instructed the state’s Department of Public Health to
do the same (AMS 1999, Hanemann 2008 121). The 1965 amendments were
created, in part, to prevent further action at the state level to control vehicle
emissions. Following California’s lead, several states had begun to propose
vehicle emissions standards. Rather than face a system of multi-tiered
distribution and a logistical nightmare, automakers rallied in support of a
national emissions regulation (Gerard & Lave 2005 766). For that reason, the
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1969 CAA broadened research funding for further research on automobile
emissions as well as low emissions fuels (AMS 1999).

The Clean Air Act of 1970
Officially designated as an amendment, the CAA of 1970 was an entirely
reshaped version of the 1963 CAA (AMS 1999). Coinciding with the creation of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, the CAA of 1970 fashioned
mobile source emission standards for automobiles and light trucks
(Ruckelshaus 2009). Drafted by Maine democratic Senator Edmund Muskie, the
amendments proposed more stringent vehicle emissions standards, “consistent
with current technology and economic feasibility” (Gerard & Lave 2005 766).
Measured against 1970 emission levels, the standards required a 90 percent
reduction in carbon monoxide and emissions by 1975 and an additional 90
percent reduction in nitrogen oxide by 1976 (Rosenbaum 2010; Gerard & Lave
2005 766). The EPA was required to establish a Federal Testing Procedure
(FTP) against which vehicle emissions would be estimated in order to obtain a
federal certification, additionally the FTP provided a foundation on which the
required 90 percent reductions would be based (Gerard & Lave 2005 767).
Each vehicle sold that failed to obtain federal certification warranted a $10,000
penalty, to be paid by that vehicle’s manufacturer. The average new vehicle
cost in 1975 was in the order of $5,000 (Gerard & Lave 2005 767). Following a
series of delays and court battles surrounding EPA testing procedures and
catalytic converters, the CAA amendments of 1977 extended the deadline to
meet motor vehicle emissions standards. As the emissions standards outlined in
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the 1970 CAA were quite ambitious, the 1977 CAA amendments designated an
additional period of time for compliance (AMS 1999).

Catalytic Converters
The catalytic converter accepts vehicle exhaust in advance of it leaving a
vehicle’s tailpipe. Structurally the most vital part of a vehicle’s emissions control
system, the catalytic converter aims to reduce harmful emissions released from
a vehicle’s engine (Sokol & Harmacy 14). Domestic auto manufacturers faced a
host of tribulations in route to attaining the 90 percent emissions reduction
required by the CAA of 1970, resulting in more than a few delays (Gerard &
Lave 2005 768). Technology considered necessary to reach the CAA mandated
reductions was not yet widely available in 1970, and significant costs faced auto
manufacturers who were required to meet them. The EPA maintained that
catalytic converters could be used to meet emissions standards, though they
were not yet widely obtainable. As well, the U.S. fleet in the early 1970s was
largely comprised of vehicles that operated on leaded gasoline. Leaded
gasoline tended to ruin catalytic converters by depositing lead inside the
converter housing (Gerard and Lave 2005 767). A sequence of court battles
between the EPA and domestic auto manufacturers (see Table 2) resulted in the
delay of the 90 percent emissions reduction date by one year (Gerard & Lave
767-768). In spite of this, domestic automobile manufacturers, without viable
alternatives, began to employ catalytic converters in mass. Catalytic converter
market dissemination, combined with the 1973-1974 oil embargo, resulted in
leaded gasoline’s virtual removal from the U.S. fuel supply in the late 1970s.
After 1980, all vehicles produced for the U.S. market are required to be
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equipped with catalytic converter technology (Sokol & Harmacy 14). For the
reason that a catalytic converters have a tendency to breakdown with age and
use, the oldest vehicles in a vehicle fleet discharge more pollution into the
atmosphere than do newer vehicles.

Table 2: Clean Air Act of 1970 Implementation Timeline
Date
Action
Clean Air Act Amendments direct EPA to set
December 21, 1970
standards and federal Test procedure
June 23, 1971
EPA sets standards for 1975 model year
National Academy of Science issues report
January 1, 1972
suggesting technology to meet standard is not yet
available
Volvo requests delay of standards. Other automakers
March 13, 1972
follow suit, including Ford, GM, and Dodge on April 5
March 12, 1972
EPA denies extension
D.C Court of Appeals hears automakers appeal and
December 18-19, 1972 remands case back to EPA for further investigation
(International Harvester V Ruckelshaus)
EPA issues supplement to Decision of the
December 30, 1972
Administrator
D.C Court of Appeals again remands (International
February, 1973
Harvester v. Ruckelshaus)
April, 1973
EPA delays HC, CO standards
June, 1973
EPA delays NOx standards
Congress extends interim HC, CO standards to 1977
June, 1974
and NOx to 1978
EPA extends interim HC, CO standards to 1977 and
February, March 1975
NOx to 1978
Clean Air Act Amendments push interim HC to 1980
August, 1977
and CO, NOx standards to 1981
(Gerard & Lave 2005 769)

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
A decade after the CAA amendments of 1977, the California state legislature
passed the California Clean Air Act (CCAA) of 1988. As air quality in California
continued to deteriorate in the ten years since the federal CAA amendments of
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1977 had passed, due to population growth that resulted in more vehicles on
California roadways, legislators sought to cope with air quality problems through
stricter air quality standards. The CCAA set forth numerous provisions including:
the full elimination of leaded gasoline, enhanced catalytic converter
requirements, gasoline-vapor recovery procedures, inspection and maintenance
(I/M) programs for vehicles, advanced fuel-injection systems for passenger
cars, mandated new emissions standards, and reformulated gasoline (Van Vorst
& George 1997 34).

Heavily based on the CCAA of 1988, the CAA amendments of 1990
promulgated the use of gasoline-vapor recovery procedures, reformulated
gasoline, and set more stringent emissions standards (McCarthy 2005 8-9).
Passenger vehicles were required to meet a 40 percent emissions reduction in
hydrocarbons, as well as a 50 percent emissions reduction in nitrogen oxide
(McCarthy 2005 8). Provision was made for a second set of reductions
beginning in year 2004, based on an evaluation of need. In 1998, the EPA
reported to Congress that further emissions reductions were both desirable and
attainable (McCarthy 2005 8). For the first time, Congress subjected minivans,
SUVs, and light trucks to passenger car emissions standards in 2004 (EPA
2008, McCarthy 2005).

The CAA amendments of 1990 required the EPA to set National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) to address pollutants harmful to both humans and
the environment (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Areas that exceed
the ambient air quality standard on four different dates over the duration of a
three-year period are considered to be in “non-attainment” (Merrifield, 1998).
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The EPA provides an updated list of non-attainment areas. Consequences for an
area that falls into non-attainment include the loss of Federal transportation
funds, the prohibition of major building projects, and general detrimental health
effects for residents of that area (Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).

Additionally, the CAA amendments of 1990 mandated that metropolitan
planning organizations (MPO) and air quality management districts (AQMD)
secure consistency between air quality management plans and new
transportation projects (Simon 1993 1). Titles I and IV of the CAA amendments
of 1990 established a market-based emissions trading system for attaining
NAAQS (Wooley and Morss 2000 13). Effectively launching the idea of cap and
trade with regard to pollution control, polluters could purchase pollution credits
from other entities, or reduce emissions in another area of their AQMD, if the
total emissions reduction remedied their own emissions discharge (Washington
1993 1). The reductions could be attained from other CAA designated sectors.
One tactic was to examine the more straightforward reductions available from
mobile emissions standards (Washington 1993 1). Thus, AVR programs
represented a cost-effective means for attaining mobile source emissions
reduction credits (MSERC). UNOCAL’s SCRAP program in 1990 provided the
UNOCAL Corporation with emissions reduction credits as “the difference in
emissions between retired and replacement vehicle” was claimed as an
emissions reduction (Simon 1993 1). Table 3 provides a lineage of the Clean Air
Act and its subsequent amendments:
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Table 3: Clean Air Act Descriptions
Date Name
Description
Air
Pollution
and
An Act to provide research and technical
1955 Control Act
assistance relating to air pollution control
Air Pollution and
1960 Control Act
Extended research funding for four more years
amendment
Air Pollution and
Instructed U.S. Surgeon General to determine the
1962 Control Act
health effects of various motor vehicle exhaust
amendment
An Act to improve, strengthen, and accelerate
1963 Clean Air Act
programs for the prevention and abatement of air
pollution
Air Act
1965 Clean
Expanded local air pollution control programs
amendment
Divided the nation into Air Quality Control Regions
Air Act
1966 Clean
(AQCRs) to monitoring ambient air quality and set
amendment
a timetable for State Implementation Plans (SIPs)
1967

Clean Air Act
amendment: Air
Quality Act

Extended authorization for research on low
emissions fuels and automobiles.

1970

Clean Air Act
amendments

1977

Clean Air Act
amendments

1990

Clean Air Act
amendments

An Act to amend the Clean Air Act to provide for a
more effective program to improve the quality of
the Nation's air.
Extended deadline to meet Motor Vehicle Emission
Standards
An Act to amend the Clean Air Act to provide for
attainment and maintenance of health protective
national ambient air quality standards, and for
other purposes.

(AMS 1999)

CAFE Standards
Prior to an exploration of EPA vehicle retirement implementation documents, it is
prudent to look at the convoluted ways in which Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards (CAFE) work in concert with the Clean Air Act. CAFE
standards, which sought to reduce energy consumption by increasing the fuel
economy of cars and light trucks (NHTSA, 2010) were endorsed in the Energy
Policy Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 as a federal response to the 1973-1974
oil embargo (Morrow, et. al, 2010, 1307; Goldberg, 1998, 1; NHTSA, 2010).
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Novel at the time of enactment, the controversial CAFE standards required
automobile manufacturers, who wished to market vehicles in the U.S., to attain a
minimum sales weighted average fuel efficiency standard of 27.5 mpg by 1985,
doubling new vehicle fuel economy (Goldberg, 1998, 1; NHTSA, 2010). Fears
concerning both energy security and impending climate change have prompted
a renewed focus on reduced fuel consumption and emissions in the U.S. over
the last decade (Evans, 2008, 3). The Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA) of 2007 altered CAFE standards by establishing a target of 35 miles per
gallon for both cars and light trucks by model year 2020 (Sissine, 2007, 1). EISA
required a 92 percent compliance rate for all passenger cars and light trucks
during a given model year, yet allows vehicle manufacturers to secure credits
for vehicle classes that exceed the revised standards in order to make up for
another vehicle class not in line with CAFE targets (Sissine, 2007, 4). In an effort
to address CO2 emissions, the Obama administration set a goal of achieving a
CAFE standard of 35.5 mpg by 2016 (Morrow et al., 2007, 1306). Canada’s fuel
consumption program established similar targets, however the program is
voluntary (EIA, 2010, 112; Transport Canada, 2010). CAFE standards in
conjunction with CAA amendments help regions thwart the possibility of falling
into air quality non-attainment. Vehicles that consume less fuel have more
efficient engines, and thus produce fewer emissions.

Massachusetts v. EPA
A point of contention surrounding the Air Quality Act of 1967 was whether states
like California, who had previously imposed their own air quality emissions
standards, would be allowed to continue to exceed government set emissions
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standards (Hanemann 2005 122). Auto manufacturers preferred a national
emissions standards benchmark, rather than a variety of state formulated
emissions yardsticks. As California’s emissions standards were more stringent
than national emissions standards, auto manufacturer arguments were
particularly strident. In the end, California alone was granted federal exemption
to continue to set its own emissions criterion (Hanemann 2005 122). A pioneer
with respect to air quality standards, Congress was inclined to indulge California
in its quest for emissions standards innovation, as advances in air quality
improvement in California might reap benefits nationally (Hanemann 2005 122).
Between 1967 and 2000, California has been granted federal exemption no less
than sixteen separate occasions (Hanemann 205 122).

The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty that created legally binding
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets for industrialized nations (Rosenbaum
2010 366). President Bill Clinton signed the treaty in 1998, but failed to consent
the U.S. Senate and was soon involved in impeachment proceedings.
Unsurprisingly, the Senate rejected the treaty (Rosenbaum 2010 375, Saundry
2005). President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001,
opting instead to set domestic policy for voluntary GHG reductions (Saundry
2005).

In the absence of federal action, states began to adopt their own GHG
emissions reduction targets (Rosenbaum 2010 376). The CAA of 1990 allows
states the option to adhere to federal vehicle emissions standards or the more
stringent California vehicle emissions standards (EDF 2008). Twelve states
adopted California vehicle emissions standards after the CAA of 1990 including:
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Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington (Pew Center on
Global Climate Change). In 2006, the EPA contended that CO2 regulation was
not warranted under the CAA, and resolved to deny California an exemption to
enact more stringent vehicle emissions standards than the federal government
on that basis (Rosenbaum 2010 377). California had historically been granted
exemption, and as the CAA amendments allowed other states to adopt
California vehicle emissions standards, the EPA opinion was challenged in
federal court (Rosenbaum 2010 377). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme
Court of the United States was petitioned by 29 entities to ascertain whether or
not the CAA warranted the EPA to regulate CO2. Table 4 lists the entities
involved in the case:
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Table 4: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency participants

Petitioner
California
Connecticut
Illinois
Maine
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Oregon
Rhode Island
Vermont
Washington
New York City
Baltimore
Washington D.C.
American Samoa
Center for Biological Diversity
Center for Food Safety
Conservation Law Foundation
Environmental Advocates
Environmental Defense
Friends of the Earth
Greenpeace
International Center for
Technology Assessment
Nation Environmental Trust
Natural Resources Defense
Council
Sierra Club
Union of Concerned Scientist
U.S. Public Interest Group

Challenger
EPA
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
National Automobile Dealers Association
Engine Manufacturers Association
Truck Manufacturers Association
CO2 Litigation Group
Utility Air Regulatory Group
Michigan
Alaska
Idaho
Kansas
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
(Meltz 2007 2)

By a 5-4 margin the court held, in its first decision on climate change, that the
CAA gave the EPA authority to regulate CO2 as its potential affect on climate
change may harm human health and the environment (Rosenbaum, 2010 377,
Meltz 2007 1).

The Supreme Court’s decision to in Massachusetts v. EPA is the latest step in
federal environmental policy that impacts the regulation of motor vehicle
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emissions. A litany of CAA amendments has resolved to police emissions from
motor vehicles in an attempt to elevate U.S. air quality. When CAA regulation
combined with CAFE standards do not produce expected motor vehicle
emissions improvements, one alternative is AVR.

EPA Implementation
The CAA amendments of 1990 touted AVR as one practical method for reducing
emissions in an inventory of potential transportation emissions source control
measures (EPA 1993 Section II). To that end, a 1993 EPA implementation
document entitled “Guidance for the Implementation of Accelerated Retirement
of Vehicles Programs” reiterated the commonly held conviction that the oldest
vehicles in a fleet are responsible for an inordinate amount of vehicle emissions
in a particular locale (Section III). Citing AVR programs as a “cost–effective
alternative to more expensive and difficult stations source emission control
measures,” EPA’s vehicle scrappage implementation document promoted “the
voluntary removal from use and the marketplace of pre-1980 model light duty
vehicles and pre-1980 light duty trucks” (EPA 1993 Section II). The U.S. Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) encapsulates the ability of an AVR program to
reduce vehicle emissions by affirming “retiring old vehicles will have a positive
impact on vehicle emissions because the vehicles being retired were originally
subject to emissions standards that were weaker than those required of new
vehicles” (OTA 1992 3). Presupposing that natural attrition corrects the
emissions consequence of a great number of vehicles, the EPA proposed
vehicle scrappage programs as a way to cope with vehicles that continue to
remain in operation for long periods of time (EPA, 1993, Section III). The eight
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requirements for an AVR program, as detailed by the EPA, are common to a
number of domestic and foreign AVR programs. Table 5 details EPA designed
requirements for AVR:

Table 5: Environmental Protection Agency Requirements for an AVR program

Requirement

Reason

Twelve month registration

To ensure that vehicles are not imported into an
area for the sole purpose of being sold in the
program, and that a vehicle owner did not
purchase a vehicle for the sole purpose of selling
that vehicle in an AVR program

Vehicle must be operable
and driven to site

To target those vehicles most likely to continue to
disperse harmful pollutants, and not those that
have little remaining useful life

Owner must be present and
possess valid title

To ensure that the legal owner of a vehicle
intends to retire the vehicle, as accepted vehicles
are dismantled and cannot be repaired

Owner must have valid
inspection and
maintenance (I/M)
certificate (where
applicable)

As a further assurance that in-use vehicles are
retired

Environmentally safe
disposal

To ensure that waste created during vehicle
dismantling is handled properly, the EPA requires
that vehicles be scrapped by licensed or
approved facilities.

Emissions estimates

For the purposes of quantifying emissions
reduction

Minimum data gathering for
programs over 2500
vehicles

Rather than collect substantial data from each
vehicle, large programs are allowed to select a
random sample in order to provide the EPA a
resource for evaluating a program
To ensure states are in accordance with EPA
guidelines for the purposes of estimating a fleet
emissions reduction

State responsibility
(EPA 1993 Section IV).
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The eight requirements for conducting an AVR program, as detailed by the EPA,
are concerned primarily with the beneficial environmental impacts an AVR
program can produce, but allow for economic benefits by permitting states to
award Mobile Source Emissions Reduction Credits (MSERCs) when clunkers are
scrapped (Merrified 1998 2).

Environmental Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Theory
In response to the promulgation of Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs as
instruments for rectifying environmental harms as a result of continued older
vehicle utilization, a plethora of literature on AVR focuses on both the potential
environmental benefits and surmised environmental detriments of vehicle
scrappage. The literature does not concentrate solely on the environmental
implications of an AVR scheme. Rather, as vehicles represent a purchasable
good, research with an environmental focus, at times, muddles through
economic speculation. Still, as any environmental strategy will ultimately face a
balance sheet, the research is worthy of examination.

The conclusion of several AVR programs led to an examination of the air quality
impacts of vehicle scrappage in a 1994 issue of the Transportation Research

Record. The analysis concluded air quality benefits attributable to AVR are, to a
great extent, uncertain for reasons including:
1. Vehicles retired in scrappage programs are likely to have been junked in
the near future without the existence of an AVR program, and
2. Retired vehicles may have sat idle, and thus produced no air quality
impacts (Hsu et al., 1994, 90).
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The review contended that in order to gauge accurate emissions reductions as
a result of an AVR program, a number of questions must be answered. Thus, the
following analytical framework was provided as a solution:
1. “How much earlier were the old automobiles retired than they otherwise
would have been without the program?
2. How much would the automobiles have been driven if they had not been
retired?
3. What were the emissions levels of the retired automobiles?
4. How were the VMT of the retired automobiles replaced?
5. How many VMT will occur on the replacement vehicle when there is one?
6. What will be the emissions levels of the replacement automobiles?” (Hsu
et al., 90).

At the time the analytical framework was provided, scrappage programs were
only recently beginning to become fervent policy topics. Consequently, costbenefit and air quality impact analysis was not yet attainable for AVR programs.
The framework suggested that despite the lack of available information from
completed AVR programs, scrutiny of AVR implementation was necessary (Hsu
et al., 1994, 98).

Examining proposed benefits and costs as a result of an AVR program, a 1995
analysis of AVR considered the implications of a scrappage program in Los
Angeles County, and attempted to establish a model for gauging the emissions
reductions for future AVR programs (Hahn, 1995, 222). The model determined
that a vehicle’s remaining lifetime was a crucial point of assessment in
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“determining whether retiring that vehicle was economical” (Hahn, 1995, 236).
However, moving from a purely economical evaluation of vehicle scrappage, the
model determined implications for location based vehicle scrappage. Hahn’s
research suggested that an AVR scheme would be most effective in polluted
urban areas “where there is a high fraction of older vehicles and the marginal
benefits from reducing pollution are high” (1995 239). The model then
anticipated that vehicle scrappage strategies would be implemented on a
temporary basis. From an emissions reduction standpoint, the study questioned
the effectiveness of vehicle scrappage programs over a long duration by
suggesting, “once the relatively dirty vehicles are removed from the fleet, the
gains from scrappage are significantly diminished” (Hahn, 1995, 239). Concerns
arise from problems with fraud, estimating the remaining lifetime of a vehicle,
and accurately testing harmful vehicle emissions. Despite these concerns, the
model concluded, “it is, indeed, possible to design scrappage programs that
will achieve some cost-effective emission reductions in selected urban areas”
(Hahn, 1995, 239).

An AVR program that subsidizes vehicle scrappage in conjunction with an
emissions tax that reflects deteriorating vehicle emissions systems over time
was postulated in 1996 to be the most effectual strategy for designing an AVR
scheme that would address the harmful environmental externalities created by
personal vehicles (Innes, 1996, 236- 237). The proposed model was similar to
current vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M) programs, currently employed
by numerous state governments. The model placed a higher tax on a vehicle’s
emission system as the vehicle aged, and reversed the effect of the tax by
offering higher scrappage subsidies for the newest vehicles in a fleet. As older
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vehicles that are retired sooner than later, reflect, “greater emission reduction
benefits because the car is off the road an additional year,” the AVR model
proposed a higher reward for vehicles retired earliest (Innes, 1996, 237). Unlike
Hahn’s model, the Innes’ model conjectures an AVR program that is continuous
“rather than a one shot” so that the temptation is removed for drivers who might
purposefully retain their vehicles solely for the purpose of later qualifying for
proposed AVR programs (Innes, 1996, 237).

A 1997 AVR analysis researched proposed AVR programs by employing the
use of a new methodology entitled CALCARS, a vehicle choice-demand usage
model for California used to simulate the response to large-scale AVR programs
at the household level (Kavalec and Setiawan 1997 95). CALCARS introduced
the ability to project the effect of an AVR on a host of new variables including:
1. Vehicle ownership,
2. Vehicle miles traveled (VMT,)
3. Fuel use,
4. Fuel efficiency, and
5. Consumer welfare, (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997, 95).

With regard to vehicle emissions, the model conjectured that reducing the age
of the vehicle fleet within a given area might benefit that area’s total average fuel
economy. Conversely, they postulated that a “higher average miles per gallon
(mpg) level and lower average vehicle age may mean more total VMT (Kavalec
and Setiawan, 1997, 95).
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Kavalec and Setiawan examined the impacts of AVR programs that targeted
vehicles both ten-plus and twenty-plus-years-old, and determined that an AVR
program that concentrated on acquiring vehicles twenty years and older might
“be a more cost effective way of reducing” pollution than a program that targets
vehicles ten-years and older (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997, 106). Various AVR
programs commonly have requirements that vehicles be older than ten to
twenty-five years of age, but not older than twenty-five years. The 2009 U.S.
CARS program stipulated that vehicles must have been “manufactured less than
25 years before the date of trade-in” (NHTSA, 2009, 6). Initially hypothesizing
that an AVR program may adversely affect “low income households by
significantly affecting the price of the lowest cost vehicles,” the research
concluded that a 20-year-plus program might retard the effect of an AVR on
used vehicles because the supply of low cost vehicles aged 10-plus-years
would remain robust (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997, 106). An extension of this
research in 2004 found that vehicle subsidies during an AVR program increased
the probability that owners of vehicles aged 10-plus-years would elect to scrap
their vehicles by 20 percent (Yamamoto et al., 2004, 924).
The prospective negative consequence of Accelerated Vehicle Retirement has
led to four objections against the supposition that AVR programs are beneficial
to the environment including:
1. The focus of previous research on AVR programs has been concerned
exclusively with vehicle use, and neglected other phases in a vehicle lifecycle that require energy including production and demolition that
stimulate emissions,
2. AVR shortens in-use vehicle lifetimes and accelerates new vehicle
production, thus escalating emissions,
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3. Due to increased energy-efficiency replacement cars are likely to be
driven more, “which leads to an increase in petrol consumption,” and
4. The proclamation that a retrofitting strategy may be favorable to an AVR
scheme, as vehicles that produce the highest amounts of pollution may
be dealt with more cost-effectively. (Van Wee et al., 2000, 138-141).
!
Analysis has concluded that AVR as an emissions reduction strategy is flawed
because the actual result is an increase in “life-cycle energy use” and
emissions, a trend that will continue unless yearly fuel efficiency improvements
are greatly augmented (Van Wee et al., 2000, 143). Kim et al. determined that
scrapping vehicles less than 20 years of age resulted in a small increase in of
CO2 emissions, when accounting for vehicle production (Kim et al., 2004, 246).
Spitzley et al. revealed that an optimal vehicle scrappage age of 10-14 years
reduced the overall cost of pollutants, ownership costs notwithstanding (Spitzley

et al., 2005, 173).

The idea that a vehicle scrappage program will produce environmental benefits
appears intuitive. Removing older vehicles with feeble emissions systems and
replacing them with vehicles that house robust emission control systems
inevitably decreases harmful tailpipe emissions, at face value. Various foreign
and domestic AVR programs ostensibly interpret such ideas at face value,
without accounting for increases in VMT or full life-cycle emissions. As well,
many domestic programs have made no conjectures as to what, if any, impact
the programs would have in areas in danger of being in air quality nonattainment. Even more curiously, some years after hybrid vehicles have become
a rational and cost-effective choice for many consumers; many programs have
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not placed an overt emphasis on the utilization of hybrid vehicles. Assumedly,
had these vehicles been utilized, a greater share of vehicle emissions could
have been reduced.

Synopsis of Environmental Motivations for AVR
Disproportionately responsible for the bulk of vehicle emissions, older vehicles
contribute unjustifiably to air pollution in urban areas (Dill 2004 22, EPA 1993
Section III, Hahn 1995 223, U.S. OTA 1992 1, Shaheen et. al. 1994 220). A
reduction in older vehicles will reduce emissions, “since older cars not only
produce higher emissions, but also fail to use new and environmentally friendlier
technologies” (Baltas and Xepapadeas, 1999, 329). In order to rectify harms
caused by vehicle emissions, progressively more stringent emissions controls
have been enacted by the United States Congress and enforced by the U.S.
EPA and NHTSA. As such emissions control measures are innately incapable of
resolving emissions harms generated by older vehicles on international
roadways, a “blunt instrument” is required to remedy the emissions damages
generated by the oldest vehicles in a vehicle fleet (Hahn 1995 239). AVR can
hasten the amount of time with which the oldest vehicles in a fleet are replaced,
thus diminishing the emissions impact of a great number of older vehicles.

Theories concerning the likelihood that an AVR program is capable of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions abound. It has been speculated that AVR can have
an impact on air pollution in urban areas by removing the oldest vehicles in the
operational vehicle fleet. Doubt concerning an AVR program’s ability to reduce
vehicle emissions conjectures that, once an older vehicle has been replaced
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with a new vehicle, the new vehicle will be driven more often. In lieu of such
supposition, many foreign and domestic AVR programs continue to implement
AVR with environmental motivations.

Economic Motivations
The attraction of Accelerated Vehicle Retirement as a medium to achieve
economic stimulus is tied directly to environmental motivations for vehicle
scrappage. When older vehicles are removed from the vehicle fleet for the
purpose of reducing pollutant emissions, replacement vehicles are an
anticipated acquisition. Historically, the economic benefits of vehicle scrappage
were merely consequential. In recent years, AVR strategies have been imposed
with the primary objective of reviving slumping automobile sales. Both foreign
and domestic countries have instituted AVR programs to resuscitate distressed
automobile manufacturers, which represent a sizeable portion of worldwide
economies. The largest of such programs, the 2009 U.S. cars program, ensued
a national economic recession. AVR programs can be implemented to stimulate
vehicle sales by offering a cash incentive to participants. The magnitude of
purchase incentives has varied according to location, and is often based on the
discretion of national leadership.

Economic Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Theory
Much of the existing economic literature concerning vehicle scrappage explores
the makeup of private economic evaluations regarding whether or not to scrap
an older vehicle (Hahn, 1995, 223). Deriving primarily from the field of
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economics, a preponderance of the literature attempts to model determinants of
participation in an AVR program, and the resulting impact on the economy as a
whole (Dill, 2001, 17; Chen and Lin, 2006, 733). Economic Theory of AVR
centers on several criteria including: age, cost of repair, incentive amount.

Age
A vehicle’s utility inherently declines with age. As well, the notion that the
decision to scrap a vehicle, once the cost to repair that vehicle is more than the
vehicle’s market value is relatively straightforward. Accordingly, initial economic
models of vehicle scrappage are consistently traced to an analysis that
scrutinized vehicle scrappage rates in the U.S. from 1949 through 1967 (Hahn,
1995, 223; Walker 1968, 503). The analysis yielded that vehicle scrappage
would occur when an owner has concluded he/she cannot “profitably repair,
recondition and resell” a vehicle (Walker, 1968, 503). Thus, the decision to
scrap a vehicle was stated to be contingent upon four identifiable
characteristics including:
1. Age
2. Condition
3. Cost of repair or reconditioning, and
4. Expected resale value (Walker 1968 503.)
!
The likelihood that a vehicle will be scrapped was established to ascend with
the age of that vehicle and level off at the most advanced vehicle ages. The
oldest vehicles in a fleet face an exceedingly decreased amount of operation.
The stabilization of vehicle scrappage rates at advanced vehicle ages was due
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in large part to a decrease in the odds that the oldest vehicles in a fleet were
being intentionally preserved by their owners as classics (Walker, 1968, 505).

The decision to scrap a vehicle was aligned to an additional set of cost criteria
in 1977 that integrated:
1. Vehicle purchase cost
2. Maintenance and repair costs, and
3. Cost of vehicle replacement (Parks, 1977, 1099).
!
By means of regression analysis, the model demonstrated that vehicle repair
costs implicitly rise with the age of a vehicle. As a result, older vehicles were
concluded to comprise those vehicles most probably scrapped (Chen and Lin,
2006, 734.) Individual vehicle owners would opt to repair their vehicles if the
costs of doing so did “not exceed the difference between the value of a working
vehicle and its scrap value” (Parks, 1977, 1100). Greenspan and Cohen later
corroborated this notion in a 1996 analysis of vehicle scrappage (Greenspan
and Cohen, 1996, 375). The decision to scrap a vehicle was analyzed in 2006
by modeling vehicle survival rates at a government agency, the Dupage County,
Illinois County Forest Preserve District (Chen & Lin, 2006, 732). It was
determined that while vehicle age alone appears to increase the probability that
a vehicle will be scrapped, other variables also contribute to the decision.
Variables include vehicle make, vehicle type, and the number of repairs
performed on a particular vehicle.

An examination of data derived from the Israeli vehicle market in 1983 took the
work of Parks (1977,) and applied it in a location-based context (Manski and
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Goldin, 1983, 365 – 366). In the vein of the 1977 model, the new model
assumed that a vehicle would be scrapped if that vehicle’s scrap value
exceeded the current market value of the vehicle, minus any needed repair
costs (Dill, 2001, 18). All other variables equal (mileage, condition, current
market value,) the model determined that a vehicle’s scrappage probability
would decrease as its price increased (Manski and Goldin, 1983, 372). Plainly,
as older vehicles are often those least valued, they are most commonly those
vehicles most likely to be scrapped. The examination determined that increases
in the scrappage rates of vehicles aged between 3 and 14 years was “due
much more to the depreciation of vehicle prices as vehicles age than to
increases in failure-proneness” (Manski and Goldin, 1983, 375).

Subsequent economic inquiry built on the assumptions of past models,
specifically that vehicles will be repaired only if the cost to do so was less than
the value of that vehicle in working condition (Berkovec, 1985, 198). Applying
these models in the context of the automobile market as a whole, a 1985
analysis determined that a progressively greater amount of owners will select to
scrap their vehicles as compounded mechanical failures within a particular
vehicle render the overall value of the vehicle near that of the vehicle’s scrapped
value (Berkovec, 1985, 199). The inquiry went on to argue that the total U.S.
vehicle fleet would grow throughout the 1980’s, not directly related to the sale of
new vehicles, but owing to the combined effects of an increase in new vehicle
price points and a decrease in the number of scrapped vehicles. The analysis
predicted that despite the fact that outputs by vehicle manufacturers would
decrease throughout the 1980s, additional numbers of aging vehicles would be
utilized as a cost saving remedy (Berkovec, 1985, 213). The inquiry concluded
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with the idea that a rise in the number of older vehicles within the U.S. vehicle
fleet would have repercussions for both “automobile safety and the
environment” (Berkovec, 1985, 213).

The age of a vehicle and that age correlation with maintenance costs are
embedded within an individual’s decision of whether or not to scrap a particular
vehicle. Vehicle age is directly coupled with a vehicle’s emissions. As such, the
age of a vehicle is significant for both environmental and economic motivational
determinants.

Incentive Amount
The determined incentive amount for a particular AVR program can influence
the decision to participate. Survey data collected during a 1992 Delaware
accelerated vehicle retirement program was scrutinized to develop a theoretical
model of vehicle ownership in which it was assumed a vehicle owner will
maximize the utility available from a single vehicle over the duration of that
vehicle’s lifetime (Alberini et al, 1995, 94). The analysis sought to model
participation in a vehicle scrappage program where monetary incentives were
offered. It was found that a potential vehicle scrappage program participant’s
“decision to scrap at any point in time depends on the difference between the
offer price and the owner’s reservation price – the minimum he is willing to
accept for the vehicle” (Alberini et al., 1995, 94). Predictably, a participant’s
reservation price would be higher under the influence of several factors
including:
1. When a vehicle warranted a high blue book value
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2. When a vehicle was in better condition,
3. When a vehicle had a longer expected remaining life,
4. When a vehicle owner anticipated low vehicle expenditures in the year to
come, and
5. When a vehicle owner had fewer additional vehicles as a means of
alternative transportation (Alberini et al., 1995, 111).
!
Equally, reservation prices were found to be lowest for vehicles “in the poorest
condition, with relatively short remaining life,” which concurred with previous
scrappage theories (Alberini et al., 1995, 111).

Examination of a 1999 AVR program in Greece conjectured that subsidy
increases in an AVR program would reduce the replacement time of an old car
and “accelerate the purchase of a new clean car” (Baltas and Xepapadeas,
1999, 333). An increase in the purchase subsidy offered during an AVR
program will reduce the number of old vehicles on the road. With respect to the
effect of subsidies in the automobile sector as a whole that the ability of an
incentive policy to induce vehicle scrappage is clear; however, the long-term
effects of an AVR scheme are uncertain (Adda & Cooper, 2000, 778-781). An
analysis of two AVR schemes in France surmised vehicle scrappage policies
stimulate individual vehicle sales during the duration of an AVR program, but
produce a subsequent reduction in vehicle sales - a major argument against the
2009 U.S. CARS program (Adda & Cooper, 2000, 778, 780-781). The study
projected that a decrease in vehicle sales will last approximately 15 years, or till
vehicles sold under the scrappage policy are deemed inoperable (Adda &
Cooper, 2000, 801).
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Research in 2007 attempted to characterize the effects of a vehicle scrappage
subsidy on both new and used car markets as a whole (Esteban, 2007, 4). The
research maintained that though AVR programs may have environmental
implications, because they upset the conventional framework of both new and
used car markets, their repercussions expand beyond their environmental
benefit (Esteban, 2007, 1). Basing examinations on a Danish AVR program,
where a bulk of participants used their scrappage subsidy to purchase used
vehicles, the analysis made a critical contribution to the economic literature on
vehicle scrappage in determining that “accounting for an active secondary
market might be critical” in the study of vehicle scrappage subsidies (Esteban,
2007, 1-2). The used car market has not been considered in many recent AVR
programs intent on providing economic stimulus including the 2009 U.S. CARS
program, as the programs have sought to stimulate the economy through the
sale of new vehicles. As scrapped vehicles are inherently used vehicles, and
would otherwise be sold in the used car market, AVR scrappage subsidies
symbolize a “price floor in the used car market” (Esteban, 2007, 2). Two
significant contributions emerged from the model: AVR subsidies that offer less
for a used vehicle than the price of that vehicle in the free market may still
induce scrappage and in order for an AVR subsidy to proficiently induce
scrappage, at minimum the subsidy must also maximize a participant’s welfare
(Esteban, 2007, 26).

Intuitively, the amount of obtainable incentive can influence a person’s decision
to participate in an AVR program. Varying incentive amounts have been used in
both foreign and domestic AVR programs. As such, incentive amount can a
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strong motivational tool in persuading a person to participate in an AVR
program.

Odometer Reading, Vehicle Make, and Vehicle Type
Several additional determinants influence the decision to scrap a vehicle,
including a vehicle’s odometer reading, the make of a vehicle, and vehicle type.
Odometers continually calculate the number of miles a vehicle has been driven
throughout its lifetime. The number of miles a car has been driven significantly
impacts the likelihood that car will be scrapped, and, “heavily used cars will be
replaced sooner” (Chen and Lin, 2006, 734; De Jong, 1996, 268).

Vehicle make may also influence the scrappage decision. Concerning domestic
vehicle makes, a 2006 analysis found that for Ford and Chevy vehicles, the
probability of scrappage increases drastically between 5 and 15 years in use,
reaching a 20 percent chance of survival after 20 years in use. The probability
that a Dodge vehicle would be scrapped increased the instant that vehicle
entered the fleet (Chen and Lin, 2006, 741-742). A previous model determined
that both German and Swiss vehicles tend to have a decreased probability of
vehicle scrappage, and remain in operation longer than similar makes from
various countries of origin (De Jong, 1996, 268).

A final determinant of vehicle scrappage is vehicle type. Cynthia Chen has
argued the idea that vehicle type is one way to forecast whether or not a vehicle
will be scrapped at length. Her 2005 model determined that minivans were
expected to be scrapped later than other vehicle types (Chen and Lin, 746). As
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well, De Jong discovered that vehicles with diesel engines are expected to
remain in the vehicle fleet for extended lengths of time over vehicles with
gasoline engines (De Jong, 1996, 268).

Odometer reading, vehicle make, and vehicle type all have significant economic
effects on the overall value of a particular vehicle. Persons holding vehicles with
the lowest value are often more inclined to participate in an AVR program,
should the available incentive supplant the additional financial burden of owning
a new vehicle. Owners of certain vehicle makes are less likely to participate in a
vehicle scrappage program. As such, odometer reading, vehicle make, and
vehicle type are essential aspects to consider in both the design of an AVR
program, as well as the decision to participate in that program.

Impact of Fuel Costs
Vehicle acquisitions embody fixed costs for a consumer, but consumers must
also account for ongoing variable costs when purchasing a vehicle. The bulk of
variable costs pertaining to car ownership are a result of the cost of fuel (Busse

et al., 2009, 2). An inquiry as to how gasoline prices affect both new and used
vehicle markets estimated that the market share of the least fuel-efficient new
vehicles would decrease by 17.7 percent when gasoline prices increased by a
mere $1. Conversely, the same inquiry estimated that the most fuel-efficient new
vehicles would increase market share by 17.5 percent (Busse et al., 2009, 34).
Concerning used vehicles, the inquiry estimated the total transaction price of
fuel-inefficient vehicles would fall by more than $1000 when gas prices
increased by a mere $1, and that the total transaction price of the most fuel-
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efficient vehicles would rise by more than $1500 (Busse et al., 2009, 35). With
reference to the U.S. CARS program, consumers faced with the possibility of a
substantial loss in vehicle worth due to fuel price increases found a strong
motivation to participate in the program as doing so would subsidize their
vehicle value loss with government funding. Concerning this trend, Li et al.
found that fuel price increases would encourage vehicle owners to hold their
fuel-efficient vehicles longer, while owners of the most fuel-inefficient vehicles
would be prompted to scrap their vehicles (Li et al., 2009, 116).

Goldberg investigated the effect of fuel prices on VMT in 1998. Her model found
that in the short-term fuel cost increases narrowly bring about a reduction in
VMT, but that over periods of sustained high fuel costs VMT would decrease
dramatically (Goldberg, 1998, 19). Additionally, the model determined that an
increase in the purchase price of a vehicle was more likely to affect consumer
vehicle choice than a “proportional increase in fuel costs (Goldberg, 1998, 20).
For the reason that AVR programs provide a decrease in the purchase price of a
vehicle, especially in times of sustained high gas prices, programs should
effectively sway more consumers to buy the most fuel-efficient vehicles. Huang
determined that only 7.2 percent of consumers opted for the most fuel-efficient
vehicles available during the 2009 U.S. CARS program (Huang, 2010, 3). Still
evaluations of singular vehicle scrappage programs are not complete without
examining factors that may have resulted in the need for such a strategy in the
first place. Throughout the past decade, fuel prices have varied drastically,
providing a strong motivator for consumer participation.
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Synopsis of Economic Motivations for AVR
In elementary terms, economic inquiry of vehicle scrappage dictates that a
vehicle’s marginal utility decreases with that vehicle’s age combined with a
number of other factors. As both the likelihood of mechanical breakdown and
probability of more frequent repair costs increase with age, older vehicles are
more apt to be scrapped. Furthermore, vehicle values decrease proportionately
to that vehicle’s age (unless at some occasion in the lifetime of a vehicle, that
vehicle is deemed to be a “classic.”) Consequently, the decision to scrap a
vehicle is based upon that vehicle’s current value, alongside the repair costs for
making the vehicle fully operational and the sustained impact of fuel prices. As
such, AVR programs most effectively motivate vehicle owners with the most
inexpensive vehicles. Likewise, rates of participation should increase when
scrappage incentives are largest (Allen et al., 2009, 9).

Urban Planning Motivations
Accelerated Vehicle Retirement can aid in eradicating a number of
environmental, social, and spatial ills in urban areas caused by motor vehicle
transportation. Namely, AVR can help retaliate against global warming, aid in
the relief of congestion in increasingly urbanized locations, increase vehicle and
road safety, and diminish air pollution. Vehicles emissions are responsible for
prodigious amounts of CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to
global warming. Global warming may produce a host of negative externalities
including: population displacement brought about by rising sea levels, the
extinction of climate sensitive species, and more frequent hurricane and drought
periods (Markham, 2009). Entwined with global climate change is a global
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increase in air pollution. Air pollution poses significant respiratory health threats
to citizens in urban areas. Removing older vehicles from roadways in both urban
and rural areas is an inherent goal of an AVR program, and one practical
method urban planners might employ to combat climate change. Whether an
AVR program focuses specifically on an environmental or economic goal is
irrelevant; a reduction in vehicle emissions will transpire.

AVR programs may aid in the removal of a great number of vehicles in urban
areas, which may reduce vehicle congestion and increase air quality. As
urbanization of the world’s population continues at a frenzied pace, space
restrictions in urban areas prevent residents from efficiently owning and
operating an automobile. Complications resulting from automobile congestion in
urban areas can harm residents’ productivity and health. Planners must seek
methods to properly increase traffic flow without jeopardizing air quality. While
public mass transit is the most efficient method for moving people throughout
urban areas, it can be expensive to implement. AVR can help reduce the
number of vehicles in an area, when the program is designed to offer a cash
incentive toward something other than the purchase of a new vehicle.

A myriad of people worldwide are injured or die in traffic accidents each year.
Urban planners face concerns regarding expected service levels for emergency
services in particular areas, issues with roadway design, as well as the general
health, safety, and welfare of residents. In instances where AVR programs offer
incentives toward the purchase of a new vehicle, a reduction in older vehicles
will result in overall increase in vehicles equipped with modern safety features.
Advances in vehicle headlights, airbags, and other standard safety features
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occur each model year. Replacing older vehicles with new vehicles may help
prevent a number of traffic related deaths, and offer planners a viable tactic for
improving the overall safety of roadways in a given community.

Urban planners are instinctively concerned with the health, safety, and welfare
of residents in a particular area. Therefore, global warming concerns along with
more general air quality concerns and traffic safety involvements are inherently
urban planning matters. AVR is one method urban planners might consider
when attempting to alleviate the harms of an auto dependent society. AVR can
be instituted by urban planners to efficiently lighten the burdens caused by
motor vehicles.

Past AVR Programs
For as long as motor vehicles have been an integral part of personal mobility,
Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR,) alternatively identified as vehicle
scrappage, cash-for-clunkers, or fleet renewal, has been proposed as a catalyst
for hastening the vehicle fleet turnover rate. In the 1920s, General Motors
Corporation (GM) concocted a method for accelerating new car sales by
requiring dealers to pay $5 into a general fund for each new vehicle they
ordered. Dealers then received $50 from the fund for older vehicles taken in
trade and subsequently scrapped (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003, 146). The
scheme was designed to remove older vehicles from the national fleet for the
purpose of invigorating new car sales.

39

Whereas the 2009 cash-for-clunkers program symbolized the first federal
program of its kind in the U.S., the notion that such a strategy could be effective
was not a contemporary one. The George H. W. Bush administration proposed a

cash-for-clunkers program in 1992, “under which states and companies [could
have met] Federal clean-air requirements by buying and scrapping the old
vehicles that generate the most pollution” (Hershey, 1992). The nation’s first AVR
program took place in 1990 in Los Angeles (Hsu and Sperling, 1994, 1444).
Entitled the “Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Project (SCRAP)” the program
scrapped 8,376 pre-1971 vehicles over a four-month period for a bounty of $700
cash (Hsu and Sperling, 1994, 1444; Dill, 2001, 7). Table 6 lists 75 known past
AVR programs:
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Table 6: Past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement Programs
Program
! 1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)
2 Greece
3 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase I
4 France
5 Delaware Vehicle Buyback Program
6 Illinois EPA (Chicago)
7 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)
8 Hungary
9 Santa Barbara Old Car buyback program
10 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase II
11 Denver Total Clean Cars Program
12 Denmark
13 Spain
14 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III)
15 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase III
16 France
17 Spain
18 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV)
19 San Joaquin Valley Vehicle Buy-Back Program
20 Ireland
21 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase IV
22 France
23 Norway
24 British Columbia Scrap-It Pilot Program
25 San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase V
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback program
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Dates
6/1/1990 - 11/18/1990
1/1/1991 - 3/31/1993
1992-1993
10/1/1992 -12/31/92
1992-1993
1993
5/26/93
9/1/1993 - 2/1994
1993 - 1996
1993-1994
12/1993 - 04/1994
1/1/1994 - 6/30/1995
4/1/1994 - 10/1/1994
1994
1994-1995
2/1994 - 06/1995
11/1994 - 6/1/1995
1995
1995-1996
1/6/1995 -12/31/1997
1995-1996
09/1995 - 09/30/1996
1996
4/1996 - 12/1998
1996-1998
1996 - 2005

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Italy
San Joaquin Valley Vehicle Buy-Back Program
Italy
California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase VI
California Consumer Assistance Program
Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program
British Columbia Scrap-It
Argentina
San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase VII
Santa Barbara Old Car buyback program
Maine High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program
California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project
California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
San Joaquin Valley REMOVE Program Phase VIII
California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback program
Santa Barbara Old Car buyback program
California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)
Texas Drive a Clean Machine
California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
Spain Plan VIVE
France Prime a la casse
Portugal Plan I
Germany
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1/1/1997 - 9/30/1997
1997-1998
2/1/1998 - 9/30/1998
11/1998 - 11/1999
1998-1999
1998 - 6/30/2001
12/1/2009 - present
1/1/1999 - present
3/22/1999 - 11/14/2000
1999-2000
5/1999 - 8/2001
11/1/2000 - 10/8/2002
7/1/2001 - 12/31/2001
3/21/2001 - 3/31/2002
1/1/2002 - 12/31/2005
2002 -2003
FY 06/07
2006 - 2008
2006 - 12/31/2010
FY 07/08
06/2007 - 04/2009
12/2007 - 11/30/2010
FY 08 - 2/8/2009
12/1/2008–10/1/2010
12/4/2008–12/31/2009
1/1/2009–8/7/2009
1/14/2009–12/31/2009

54 Cyprus
55 Luxembourg
56 Canada (Retire Your Ride)
57 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
58 Italy
59 Slovakia Plan I
60 Austria (Verschrottungspra!mie)
61 Slovakia Plan II
62 United Kingdom
63 Spain Plan 2000E
64 The Netherlands
65 Japan
66 United States
67 Portugal Plan II
68 Greece
69 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback program
70 France Prime a la casse 2
71 Ireland
72 Romania
73 Russia
74 France Prime a la casse 3
75 Cyprus
(See Appendix A. for Citations)
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1/16/2009 - 9/16/2009
1/22/2009–10/1/2010
2/1/2009 - 3/31/2011
2/9/2009 - 12/31/2010
2/7/2009–12/31/2009
3/9/2009–3/25/2009
4/1/2009–12/12/2009
4/6/2009–12/31/2009
5/1/2009–3/31/2010
5/22/2009–5/18/2010
5/29/2009 - 12/31/2010
6/19/2009 - 3/31/2010
7/1/2009 - 8/24//2009
8/8/2009–12/31/2009
9/30/2009–11/2/2009
2009-2010
1/1/2010 - 6/30/2010
1/1/2010 - 12/30/2010
2/15/2010 - 11/23/2010
3/8/2010 - 12/31/2010
7/1/2010 - 12/31/2010
10/11/2010 - 12/13/2010

Varying Objectives
Past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs list various primary objectives.
Several of the first AVR programs sought vehicle scrappage as a way to earn
MSERCs in heavily polluted areas. Other programs have pursued broad based
emissions pollution reduction as a primary objective. More recent programs
have employed AVR for the primary purpose of stimulating new car sales. Still
other programs pursued primary objectives specific to an issue found only in
their respective location. (See Tables 52 – 61)

Varying Scales
Past Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs have occurred in areas with
divergent populations. The total population of an area where an AVR program is
conducted can have ramifications on the number of vehicles retired and number
of participants throughout an AVR program’s tenure. All other factors being
equal (incentive amount, eligible vehicle criteria, and government investment)
one would assume that AVR programs carried out in areas with larger
populations would generate greater total program effectiveness. (See Tables 16

– 20)

2009 Economic Climate
Faced with escalating fuel prices, a slowing global economy, and rising
unemployment, automobile purchases were a distant consideration for much of
the American citizenry in 2009 (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 1-2). The
accumulated economic misfortunes of 2009 exposed weaknesses in both
foreign and domestic automotive industry business models. However, obstacles
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for automakers were present long before President Obama announced the
enactment of the first federal AVR program.

The U.S. automotive industry had encountered a sustained reduction in vehicle
sales over the last three decades, attributed to reductions in quality and the
emergence of viable foreign vehicle alternatives (Clark et. al., 2009, 1). In the
summer of 2008, with heightened fear of global terrorism and wars in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, the price of oil reached a record $147 a barrel (Leech,
2010). Subsequently, gas prices climbed in many parts of the country from
prices just over $2 per gallon to an average of over $4 per gallon, more than $5
in some parts, resulting in a national average of $4.11 in the U.S. (Leech, 2010;
Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 2). New motor vehicle sales annually account for
around 10 percent of total consumer merchandise spending in the leading
industrial economies (Stanford, 2010, 2). Faced with a sinking economy and
high fuel prices, scores of Americans restricted spending on both major and
trivial purchases. At the same time, owners of the most fuel-inefficient vehicles
began to reconsider their means of transportation. Yet, faced with a reduced
availability of credit, many consumers opted to suffer financially, via increased
expenditures on fuel, rather than suffer the loss of resale values in the vehicle
market (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 1-2).

The result of combined economic hardships was a population largely apathetic
to the U.S. automobile market. Nationwide, 2008 vehicle sales endured a 2.9
million unit sales decrease in cars and light trucks from the previous year and a
4.6 million unit decrease from the vehicle sales zenith observed at the turn of the
century (Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, 1-2). 2009 vehicle sales were down 35
45

percent in the U.S., 11 percent in Canada, and 41 percent in Russia (AECA,
2010).

The year 2009 saw trials affecting the automotive industry including:
1. a global recession
2. a crisis in global credit markets
3. bankruptcy of both General Motors Corporation (GM) and Chrysler LLC
4. financial bailout packages provided by the federal government for both
GM and Chrysler that included provisions for governmental ownership
5. automobile plant closings
6. automotive worker buyouts, and
7. the cash-for-clunkers program at summers end (Canis and Yacobucci,
2010, 1).

Financial bailouts were allocated to support domestic automakers in the fall of
2008 by then President George W. Bush. North American automotive industry
bailouts were unique to international approaches in two respects:
1. Government assistance was requisite to ensure the automakers survival,
and
2. The rescue of the U.S. automotive manufacturers “occurred within the
context of a continental market that has come to be dominated by
offshore-based producers” (Stanford, 2010, 2).
Automotive industry bailouts met varying degrees of public support and
suspicion. Many argued the dilemma of the domestic automotive industry was
the result of several decades’ worth of declining quality. Others believed the
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automotive industry should be left to meet its own demise. Still, others reasoned
that should the automotive industry fail, the nation’s entire economy would
implode. The devastating economic consequences of 2008 and 2009
amalgamated so that by mid-2009, theories began to advance concerning the
improbability of the U.S. auto sector’s ability to survive. A new mechanism was
required to ensure the automotive industry would endure.

Timeline
A host of hurdles stood between the idea of a national vehicle scrappage
program and the eventual execution of the Cash-for-clunkers program of 2009.
A chain of events that began a year prior to the program’s completion are
important to note in order to describe the method by which the NHTSA elected
to conduct the federal AVR program. The timeline in table 7 details the events
that impacted the U.S. CARS program:
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Table 7: U.S. Cash-For-Clunkers Timeline of Events
The U.S. House of Representatives reject a $700 billion
Asset Relief Program (TARP) rescue bill by a
September 29, 2008 Troubled
vote of 228-205, subsequently the Dow fell 777.68 points,
the largest one-day loss in history.

October 1, 2008

The U.S. Senate passes an amended TARP bill

October 3, 2008

August 7, 2009

The U.S. House of Representatives votes in favor of TARP
funds for the banking industry.
President George W. Bush implores Congress to release
$25 billion in loans to U.S. automakers. Controversy
erupts, as loans were not originally intended to relieve
automakers.
$17.4 billion in TARP funds are distributed to GM and
Chrysler
A Cash for Clunkers bill is proposed in Congress
Both GM and Chrysler ask for additional funds totaling $5
billion.
President Barack Obama asks GM CEO, Rick Wagoner to
resign as part of a total restructuring plan
Chrysler announces that it will file for bankruptcy
GM enters bankruptcy. The U.S. government provides the
company $30.1 billion in additional TARP funds in
exchange for 60% ownership in the company once it
emerges from bankruptcy.
The Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act
(CARS) of 2009 is passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives
CARS is passed by the U.S. Senate
GM emerges from bankruptcy
President Barack Obama signs the Consumer Assistance
to Recycle and Save Act of 2009
The CARS program begins at U.S. dealerships
Congress appropriates an additional $2 billion for the
CARS program

August 25, 2009

The CARS program ends

November 14, 2008
December 19, 2008
January 2009
February 17, 2009
March 30, 2009
April 30, 2009
June 1, 2009

June 9, 2009
June 18, 2009
July 10, 2009

July 24, 2009
July 27, 2009

(Clark et. al, 2009, 2-3; Canis and Yacobucci, 2010, NHTSA, 2009, Li et al., 2010, 7).

Though it lasted a mere 55 days, the U.S. Cash-for-clunkers program of 2009
stimulated the U.S. economy through an increase of vehicle sales, and altered
the age makeup of the national vehicle fleet (Huang, 2010, 2).
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2009 U.S. Cash for Clunkers
The Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009 (CARS) (U.S.C. 49,
§ 32901) enacted by Congress was signed into law by President Barack Obama
on June 24, 2009 and required the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) to administer an AVR program (NHTSA, 2009, 3).
NHTSA was mandated to formulate a strategy for the CARS program within 30
days of the law’s ratification. NHTSA was not instructed to submit the proposed
strategy back to Congress prior to the strategy’s implementation (NHTSA, 2009,
5,) a controversial aspect for people concerned with fiscal responsibility. The
Act initially appropriated $1 billion for the CARS program, for which $50 million
was to be towards administrative expenses; 12 days into the program Congress
provided an additional $2 billion was provided (Pub. L. 111-47) owing to the
program’s early success (NHTSA, 2009 3-4).

Originally deemed the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009,
the designation was later only used with reference to the act signed by the
President in June. The Acronym CARS denoted “Car Allowance Rebate System”
throughout the program’s tenure. Responsible for the first federal AVR program
in the United States, NHTSA worked in conjunction with the EPA to determine
fuel economy ratings for both clunker and new-vehicle eligibility throughout the
program (NHTSA, 2009, 5-6). The CARS program officially launched July 27th,
2009 and was terminated prematurely on August 25, 2009, as funds allocated
by Congress for the program had been exhausted (Li et al., 2009).
The U.S. CARS program combined two goals: promoting auto sales to benefit a
lackluster economy that had been especially hard on U.S. automotive
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manufacturers, and to improve the environment by replacing old vehicles with
vehicles that provided an increase in fuel economy (Yacobucci and Canis,
2009, 2; Li et al., 2010, 4, U.S. GAO, 2010). CARS offered consumers a financial
incentive towards the purchase or lease of a new vehicle, if that vehicle
represented an increase in fuel economy when compared to a consumer’s old
vehicle (Yacobucci and Canis, 2009, 1; U.S. GAO, 2010, 4). The financial
incentive provided to consumers was a rebate of up to $4,500 based on the set
of criteria in table 8 formulated by NHTSA (Yacobucci and Canis, 2009, 1;
NHTSA, 2009, 6) including:

Table 8: CARS Rebate Value Criteria
New Vehicle Category
Rebate
Value
$4,500

$3,500

Passenger
Automobile
At least 10 mpg
higher fuel
economy than
trade-in

Category 1
Truck
At least 5 mpg
higher than
trade-in

Category 2
Truck
At least 2 mpg
higher than tradein

Category 3
Truck
None

22 mpg minimum

18 mpg minimum

15 mpg minimum

At least 4 mpg
higher than tradein

At least 2 mpg
higher than
trade-in

At least 1 mpg
higher than tradein OR trade-in is a
MY2001 or newer
category 3 truck

Trade-in is
MY2001 or newer
category 3 truck

22 mpg minimum

18 mpg minimum

15 mpg minimum

Trade-in is of
similar size or
larger than new
truck

(Yacobucci and Canis, 2009, 4).

Rebate values wholly depended on increase in fuel economy (Huang, 2010, 4).
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Four criteria were also established regarding trade-in vehicle eligibility. The
criteria were designed to ensure that vehicles received throughout the program
would not otherwise continue to be utilized as mode of transportation. Table 9
details eligibility criteria established for the U.S. CARS program:

Table 9: CARS Vehicle Eligibility Criteria
•
•

Trade in Vehicle

•

•
New Vehicle
(Purchased or
Leased)

•
•

Is in drivable condition
Has been both continuously insured, consistent with the laws of your
States, and continuously registered to the same owner for at least
one year immediately prior to the trading-in your vehicle under the
CARS program
Manufactured less than 25 years before the date of trade (i.e.,
before mid- to late- 1984) and, in the case of category 3 trucks, not
later than model year 2001
Has combined MPG of 18 or less (this does not apply to category 3
trucks, i.e., very large pickup trucks or cargo vans)
Is new (i.e., legal title has not been transferred by anyone)
Has manufacturer’s suggested retail price of $45,000 or less

(Li et al., 2010; U.S. GAO, 2010, 5)

Vehicles traded-in during the program were dismantled to ensure they did not
reappear in the vehicle fleet and continue polluting (Li et al., 2010, 7).

Motivation
The idea that federal programs can be used to stimulate national spending can
be traced to British economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynesian economics
espouses the view that governments should stabilize consumer demand
through deficit spending to prevent economic recessions (Smiley, 2008). Where
classical economics maintains that macroeconomic business cycles are
efficient, Keynesian economics argues that government intervention may be
necessary to stabilize national economies during times of economic hardship
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(McKeehan 2008 4). Keynesian economics considers unemployment to be a
“more serious problem than inflation,” and advocates the “multiplier effect”
where expenditures resonate throughout an economy (McKeehan 2008 4).

President George W. Bush signed H.R. 5140 – The Economic Growth Act of
2008 on February 1, 2008. The first of what would be a litany of Keynesian
economic stimulus spending, offered a tax rebate for working families,
provisions for capital expenditures made by small business, and increased
government housing loan limits (Hutchison and Hughes 2008). President
Obama signed the American Recovery and Investments Act H.R. 1 of 2009 on
February 17, 2009. The act intended to save existing jobs and create new ones,
spur economic activity through government infrastructure spending, and
provide tax cuts and benefits for working families (recovery.gov 2010). Both acts
evoked the Keynesian principle that a government could generate economic
activity through deficit spending. The supplemental Consumer Assistance to
Recycle and Save Act of 2009 (CARS) (U.S.C. 49, § 32901) signed by President
Obama on June 24, 2009, built directly on the assumption that governments
could spend their way out of a recession. As motor vehicles exhibit a substantial
purchase price, should enough consumers opt to partake of government offered
incentives, reverberations would be felt throughout the U.S. economy. Such
motivations led President Obama and both houses of Congress to ratify the
Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009. The motivations were
not exclusively intended to relieve ailing automakers, but rather, the U.S.
economy as a whole.
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Results
In an internal memorandum dated April 22, 2010 NHTSA Administrator David L.
Strickland described the CARS program as a “remarkable success story and an
example of exemplary service provided by the Federal Government to the
American people in times of crisis” (2010, 1). Strickland went on to remark that
the “program was highly successful in accomplishing its primary goals of
stimulating the economy and aiding the environment (Strickland, 2010, 1). Table
10 details the numerical extent of the program:

Table 10: Results of the U.S. Cars Program
Component
Number of participating dealerships
Number of participating states
Voucher applications
Paid vouchers
Cancelled transactions
Average voucher amount
Total voucher amount
Total new vehicles sold or leased (passenger cars)
Total new vehicles sold or leased (light trucks)
Total new vehicles sold or leased (heavy trucks)
Average combined EPA fuel rating
Replaced vehicle average combined EPA fuel rating
Average difference in fuel economy
Percent of vehicles manufactured domestically
Estimated increase in GDP
Jobs created or saved
Estimated reduction in fuel consumption over 25 years
Estimated reduction in fuel consumption annually
Estimated reduction in carbon dioxide over 25 years
Estimated social benefit of carbon dioxide reduction

Total
18,908
50*
690,114
677,842
12,272
4,209
$2.85 billion
401,274
274,602
1,966
24.9
15.8
9.2
49%
$3.8 to $6.8 billion
over 60,000
824 million gallons
33 million gallons
9 million metric tone
$278 million

* as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana and Virgin Islands,
and Puerto Rico (NHTSA, 2009, 2).
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Throughout the CARS program, trade-in vehicles were primarily domestically
manufactured. The majority of decommissioned vehicles came from Ford,
Chevrolet, and Dodge. 46.6% percent of the new purchases came from Asian
manufacturers Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Hyundai. The discrepancy raises
doubt about how fully the stimulus money went to the American economy.

Public Reception
The national news media squandered little time in touting opinions about the
proposed success or failure of the CARS program. The Berkeley Electronic
Press ballyhooed early estimates that the CARS program represented a “net
drain on society of roughly $2,000 per vehicle” and claimed the “total welfare
loss to be $1.4 billion.” The same article acknowledged “the popularity of CARS
should be no surprise: it gives participants a substantial gift… meanwhile the
burden of the program is dispersed over a large group of taxpayers” (Abram
and Parsons, 2009, 3). Others conjectured that program was designed to divert
attention from the already deep intervention of the government into the U.S.
automotive industry (Graham, 2009). An article entitled “Cash for Clunkers: A
Retrospective” appeared in The American in June of 2010, and put forward the
idea of a CARS type AVR program during the OPEC fuel crisis under President
Carter. The article surmised the implications that such a program would have
had on modern classic vehicle markets, as well as the idea that the CARS
program obliterated the concept that “one man’s trash is another’s treasure.” In
the rather scathing article the author challenged that CARS “broken policy” was
“an old-fashioned wealth transfer” and that “the policy allowed politicians to
claim success despite failure” (Borders, 2010).
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Jeffrey D. Sachs in an article for the Scientific American put forth “billions of
dollars were spent quickly without clear answers on what we were getting for our
money.” Sachs also alleged there were “countless ways to reduce CO2
emissions” that “are less expensive than smashing up autos five years before
their natural demise” (Sachs, 2009). The New American went on to propose
“consumers participate, of course, because they are able to get more money for
their old cars than the old cars are worth – in many cases thousands of dollars
more” (Benoit, 2009).

Albeit the 2009 U.S. CARS program had disproportionate media attention and a
colossal economic cost, the brief duration of the program alongside vast
government expenditures across a host other economic sectors has afforded
the program little academic evaluation to date. In spite of this, a small number of
assessments have been conducted. Three comprehensive examinations of the
U.S. CARS program have ensued since the program’s termination that account
for auto sales and jobs (economic factors,) as well as the program’s effects on
the environment. A CARS synopsis reported to the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, as well as the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
in December of 2009 by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. April
2010 provided an additional CARS assessment by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. A subsequent CARS evaluation by a private government
think-tank transpired in August 2010. Studies vary in degrees of agreement with
NHTSA Administrator David L. Strickland’s summation that the “CARS program
achieved the objectives set out by Congress to increase automotive sales and
aid the environment” (Strickland, 2010, 6).
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Economic Evaluation
Of the first environmental evaluations to surface regarding the CARS program
was a lengthy August 13, 2009 report entitled The Implied Cost of Carbon

Dioxide under the Cash for Clunkers Program. The analysis suggested, through
slack calculation, that the program was, at best, a highly expensive way to
reduce vehicle pollution (Knittel, 2009, 1). A scenario which used a computation
of the highest rebate offered for a trade-in vehicle under the CARS program,
$4,500, estimated that the per ton cost of saved carbon dioxide under the
program was on average over $400 per ton. The average cost was reached
using the following parameters:
1. $4500 rebate
2. Average VMT of 12,000 miles
3. Clunker fuel economy of 16 mpg
4. New vehicle fuel economy of 25 mpg
5. Per year savings of 270 gallons of gasoline by switching vehicles
6. Carbon Dioxide creation of 20 pounds for a burned gallon of gasoline

In determining price estimates for greenhouse gas (GHG) allowances under the
Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimates that the price for GHG emission allowances over the period
2011 – 2019 will cost on average $23 (CBO, 2009, 11). At a cost of $23, the
analysis’ preliminary projections are that the U.S. CARS program exceeded this
average by approximately $375 per ton (Knittel, 2009, 3). A similar valuation of
CO2 emissions reduction by Li et al., estimated the cost ranged from $91 to
$295 per ton (Li et al., 2010, 6).
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A more recent evaluation of the CARS program attempted to address effects on
employment using a geometric decay function. Between both vehicle assembly
and parts industry employment, the model found that one job-year was created
for every 67 vehicles sold under the program, or 3,676 job-years total (Li et al.,
2010, 28). The same study determined that CARS induced approximately .39
million-vehicle sales throughout the program’s duration (Li et al., 2010, 20).

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) maintained, “the extent to which
the program stimulated vehicle sales, as measured by the number of vehicle
sales attributable to the CARS program, is unclear” (GAO, 2010, 13). The reason
for the ambiguous nature of their analysis concerns “incremental vehicle sales,”
or vehicles that were sold as a direct result of the program that would not have
otherwise occurred. They determine incremental vehicle sales cannot be
accurately calculated (GAO, 2010, 13). Equally, the GAO maintains that the
program’s effect on gross domestic product is uncertain; this, too as a result of
incremental vehicle sales remaining undefined (GAO, 2020, 16). The GAO
speculates the lack of consensus of the CARS program’s impact on employment
can be attributed to incremental vehicle sales as well (GAO, 2010, 17).

Despite the near constant advertising of the CARS program’s effects on the
economy by President Obama and the democrat-led Congress that helped to
pass the legislation, to a great extent evaluations of the program’s effect on the
economy remain inconclusive. Opponents argue that the program, in effect,
subsidized a large number of vehicle consumers. Proponents maintain that the
program preserved auto-manufacturing jobs by delaying plant closures due to
an increased need for production. Despite both accusations, the central
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question remains – would vehicles sold throughout the duration of the CARS
program have been sold without the program? Thus far, results are inconclusive.

Environmental Evaluation
Opponents of CARS argue that environmental impact of the program was
abysmal. One point of contention maintains that in the absence of the program,
fleet fuel economy would have improved due to previously imposed more
stringent CAFE standards under the Bush administration (Huang, 2010, 2). In
spite of this, Huang (2010) found that for the reason that an extra $1,000 was
awarded to consumers who gained the most extreme improvements in fuelefficiency, 7.2 percent of consumers elected to purchase vehicles with the
highest fuel-efficiency ratings (Huang, 2010, 3). Such behavior produced an
environmental benefit by reducing emissions (as vehicles with aged emissions
were traded-in and scrapped) and a decrease in fuel consumption (Huang,
2010, 3).

Researchers at the University of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute
later conducted an analysis of the effect of the CARS program on vehicle fuel
economy. The study examined the average fuel economy of vehicles purchased
in both July and August 2009, and found that average fuel economy improved a
mere 0.6 in July 2009 and 0.7 in August 2009 (Sivak and Schottle, 2009, 4). An
additional estimation determined the CARS program reduced the total gasoline
consumption of trade-in vehicles by approximately 2,915 gallons – “8 days’
worth of current U.S. gasoline consumption (Li et al., 2010, 23). The GAO
maintains that while the CARS program succeeded in placing more fuel-efficient
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vehicles on the Road, the extent to which the program reduced fuel
consumption is uncertain (GAO, 2010, 18).

Comparable to economic evaluations of the CARS program, estimations
concerning the environmental impacts are largely inconclusive to date. We know
that the CARS program eradicated nearly 700,000 vehicles from America’s
roadways and replaced them with vehicles that, at the very least, represented
increases in fuel economy. By itself, this accomplishment should have
significant impacts on environmental quality. When fuel life-cycle CO2 emissions
and alleged increases in VMT are taken into consideration, supposed
environmental improvements under the program may be canceled out.

Alternatives to Accelerated Vehicle Retirement
Few programs exist comparable in both scale and scope to AVR. As AVR can
be implemented at various civic scales, alternatives must account for dilemmas
that can arise at more than a few dimensions. To date, only two alternatives
appear qualified to work in tandem or supplant AVR programs.

Inspection and Maintenance Programs
When considering the impacts of an AVR program it is common sense to
ascertain how programs might work in conjunction with a vehicle inspection and
maintenance (I/M) strategy. I/M programs require motorists to periodically
subject their vehicles to emissions testing at a local inspection facility
(Harrington et al., 154). Vehicle I/M strategies effectively identify the highest
polluters in a vehicle fleet and enforce procedures for their repair (Yamamoto et
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al., 2004, 906). Whereas AVR programs induce vehicle replacement more often
than not at the end of a vehicle’s lifetime, I/M programs ascertain whether or not
a vehicle is operating efficiently, in terms of emissions controls systems,
throughout the lifetime of a vehicle. Few other mechanisms exist to ensure
vehicles emissions systems are up to standard after purchase (Moghadam,
2010, 285).

The EPA has suggested that vehicle scrappage in conjunction with an I/M
program can “improve program benefit and/or reduce costs” (EPA, 1993,
Section VIII). Stringent I/M programs can increase vehicle scrappage (Hahn,
1995, 240). Recent evaluations of I/M programs in France dictate that vehicle
owners have a propensity to keep their vehicles 20% longer on average in an
area with an I/M policy, as vehicles are apt to be maintained more effectively
over the course of their operable lifetime (Yamamoto et al., 2004, 923-924).

Apprehensions concerning the costs of conducting a vehicle I/M program, and
a program’s forced cost upon a local citizenry, often prevent this strategy from
emerging as a convincing approach towards emissions reduction. In an
examination of an Arizona I/M program, Harrington et al. found that owners of
the oldest vehicles will suffer the most substantial repair costs under an I/M
program, as older vehicles failed I/M tests most often (Harrington et al., 2000,
162). Such a situation generates uncertainties pertaining to fairness. Still, the
same analysis found that the oldest vehicles cede the highest emissions
reductions (Harrington et al., 2000, 162). For that reason, researchers have
found that minute reductions in pollution abatement targets for I/M programs,
yield substantial cost reductions (Moghadam & Livernois, 2010, 297).
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Additionally, decreasing the inspection testing intervals from an annual
requirement to one that takes place biannually could significantly reduce costs
as well as aid in a more effective strategy for targeting high polluting vehicles
(Moghadam & Livernois, 2010, 296).

As national I/M programs do not exist, and states vary greatly on the level of
scrutiny applied during vehicle inspection, I/M programs cannot be viewed as a
national alternative to vehicle scrappage. Rather, a continual I/M program that
enforced vehicle scrappage after a certain point in an emissions control
system’s degradation would be preferable. As such the most effective scenario
would be a vehicle scrappage program performed in union with an I/M program.

Hybrid Vehicle Purchase Tax Credit
Hybrid vehicle income tax credits were provided by the Energy Policy Act of
2005 between December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2010 (IRS, 2007). Income
tax credits were provided to consumers that purchased a number of hybrid cars
and several hybrid sport utility vehicles and trucks. Foreseen as an approach to
effectively alter consumer purchase behavior, hybrid vehicle tax credits were
available in amounts ranging from $3,100.00 to $250.00 depending on the type
of vehicle purchased and that vehicle’s fuel economy (IRS, 2007.) Despite the
fact that a number of consumers took advantage of the tax credit, hybrid vehicle
market share was a mere 3% in 2010 (Miravete and Moral, 2010, 4). Hybrid
vehicles remain an anomaly in the U.S. alongside a new vehicle fleet largely
dependent on gasoline propulsion. As such, consumers remain wary of new
hybrid vehicle technology. Hybrid vehicle income tax credits are the closest
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current alternative to a vehicle scrappage program in the U.S. because they
effectively disperse a cash incentive to consumers who opt to trade-in their old
vehicle for a new hybrid vehicle. The difference between hybrid vehicle income
tax credits and a vehicle scrappage program is that consumers claim the
incentive at some point in the future (on their income tax statement) rather than
at the point of sale. This delayed satisfaction may explain why more of the
credits have not been utilized, and why hybrid vehicle market share remains
low.

Government Performance Results Act of 1993
The Government Performance Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) required federal
government agencies to formulate goals and performance monitoring plans for
proposed programs within an agency’s budget (Heen 2000 1). GPRA
correspondingly required agencies to measure and report program outcomes to
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to Congress (Heen 2000 1).
Congress enacted GPRA after finding:
•

“waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the confidence of
the American people in the Government and reduces the Federal
Government's ability to address adequately vital public needs;

•

Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve
program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insufficient articulation
of program goals and inadequate information on program performance;
and
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•

Congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program oversight
are

seriously

handicapped

by

insufficient

attention

to

program

performance and results (U.S. Congress 103-62).

The Government Performance Results Act had a number of purposes including:
•

to “improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies
accountable for achieving program results;”

•

to “initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those
goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;”

•

to “improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer
satisfaction;”

•

to “help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that
they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with
information about program results and service quality;”

•

to “improve congressional decision making by providing more objective
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and”

•

to “improve internal management of the Federal Government” (U.S.
Congress 103-62).

All agencies of the federal government, including independent agencies and
agencies classified as government corporations, are bound by GPRA. The
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Legislative Branch, Judicial Branch, Central Intelligence Agency, Panama Canal
Commission, and the Postal Rate Commission are not required to follow GPRA
guidelines. As well, the Postal Service has separate GPRA requirements (OMB
Watch 2002).

GPRA requires government agencies to formulate three plans including:
•

a strategic plan

•

a performance plan, and

•

performance results (OMB Watch 2002).

Strategic Plan
GPRA requires agencies to develop a strategic plan. The strategic plan must
include the following:
•

a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and
operations of the agency;

•

general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and
objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency;

•

a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved,
including a description of the operational processes, skills and
technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources
required to meet those goals and objectives;

•

a description of how the performance goals included in the plan shall be
related to the general goals and objectives in the strategic plan;
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•

an identification of those key factors external to the agency and beyond
its control that could significantly affect the achievement of the general
goals and objectives; and

•

a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising
general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program
evaluations” (US Congress 103-62)

The formulation of a strategic plan, as outlined by GPRA, could have positive
effects on implementation of AVR programs at various scales. The clear wording
and precise requirements outlined by the GPRA strategic plan are in place to
ensure both a minimal margin of error and program transparency. Both
elements are essential to an AVR program’s success. As well, GPRA requires
that in developing a strategic plan, government agencies consult with Congress
and solicit input from outside stakeholders who might be affected by the plan
(OMB Watch 2002).

Performance Plan
GPRA also requires agencies to develop an annual performance plan. The
performance plan requires agencies to do the following:
•

“establish performance goals to define the level of performance to be
achieved by a program activity;

•

express such goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form

•

briefly describe the operational processes, skills and technology, and the
human, capital, information, or other resources required to meet the
performance goals;
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•

establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing
the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program
activity;

•

provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established
performance goals; and

•

describe the means to be used to verify and validate measured values”
(U.S. Congress 103-62).
!

Performance plans, as required by GPRA, can aid AVR programs in attaining
established objectives. In setting numerical goals, the performance plan, can
help an agency or program ascertain whether or not a program has been
successful and provide opportunity to modify a program while the program is in
action. The requirement of performance plans to “establish performance
indicators to be used in measuring… outcomes” of a program can help AVR
programs to correctly define attainable objectives.

Performance Reports
To ascertain the execution of both strategic and performance plans, required by
GPRA, performance reports are to be published. The performance report is
required to accomplish the following:
•

“review the success of achieving the performance goals of the fiscal year;

•

evaluate the performance plan for the current fiscal year relative to the
performance achieved toward the performance goals in the fiscal year
covered by the report;
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•

explain and describe, where a performance goal has not been met
(including when a program activity's performance is determined not to
have met the criteria of a successful program activity or a corresponding
level of achievement if another alternative form is used)
–

why the goal was not met;

–

those plans and schedules for achieving the established
performance goal; and

–

if the performance goal is impractical or infeasible, why that is the
case and what action is recommended;

•

describe the use and assess the effectiveness in achieving performance
goals of any waiver

•

include the summary findings of those program evaluations completed
during the fiscal year covered by the report” (U.S. Congress 103-62)

Performance reports can be instrumental in evaluating the success of an AVR
program. An AVR performance plan would detail those actions applied correctly
by an AVR and determine why any actions failed.

The Government Performance Results Act of 1993 can be an essential
evaluation tool when applied to an AVR program. GPRA requires that an agency
clearly define strategic goals and objectives prior to a plan’s implementation.
Clearly defined objectives are elusive in some AVR programs. As well, GPRA
was not applied to the 2009 U.S. CARS program for reasons unknown. Though,
not all AVR programs transpire domestically, the U.S. GPRA provides a template
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for determining an efficient course of action that accounts for varying outcomes,
and evaluating unintended consequences.
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SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE
Planners and policymakers are tasked with reducing environmental and
economic consequences that stem from a society travel-dependent on motor
vehicles. An often-implemented solution to correct ills generated by older
vehicles still in operation is Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR). Over fifty
domestic and international AVR programs have been executed since 1990,
including the 2009 U.S. CARS program, the largest such program to date.

Economic and environmental theories abound concerning how to most
effectively conduct an AVR program. The advantages and detriments of an AVR
scheme have direct effects on consumers as well as the economy and
environment as a whole. A sizeable catalogue of past AVR programs exists as
an instrument for framing an effective AVR policy. As well the Government
Performance Act of 1993 provides a template for monitoring a program’s
efficacy prior to and throughout AVR implementation.
Vehicle retirement programs can expeditiously modify entire vehicle fleets for
both environmental and economic purposes. However, objectives vary across
vehicle retirement programs. AVR implementation has occurred on diverse
national and urban scales, backed with various motivations. Design of AVR
programs has not been methodical. As evaluation is an essential part of
government planning, given the lack of an accepted framework for AVR
program design, this research has considered how various AVR objectives
might be characterized to aid in developing a framework for future AVR
programs. This research will attempt to answer the following research questions:
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•

What categorizations can be made concerning articulated objectives of
past accelerated vehicle retirement programs

•

How can characterizations of the objectives and outcomes of past
Accelerated Vehicle Retirements programs be use to formulate an
implementation criteria that addresses both economic expectations and
also environmental regulation at varying civic scales?

•

What performance measures would ensure that an Accelerated Vehicle
Retirement program attained defined objectives while minimizing causal
burdens?

70

METHODOLOGY
Accelerated Vehicle Retirement (AVR) programs have been implemented as a
means to removing a large number of older vehicles, which produce an
excessive amount of vehicle emissions, from the vehicle fleet. Over fifty AVR
programs have taken place since 1990. Vehicle scrappage programs place
varying levels of emphasis on factors affecting program performance and
articulated objectives, which results in varying outcomes. While design of an
AVR program is a product of intended objective, commonalities exist between
programs. In order to create a framework for designing an accelerated vehicle
retirement program multiple methods are required.

Content Analysis
To determine what categorizations can be made concerning articulated
objectives of past accelerated vehicle retirement programs, data was obtained
from a number of resources. Content analysis was utilized to mine the data for
the following:
•

Order and type of articulated objective

•

Program performance

•

Scale of program, and

•

Factors affecting program performance

The data was compiled in an Excel document. Content analysis was then
performed on the collected data to identify patterns in programs’ specified
objectives. The analysis provided a way to characterize specified objectives,
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determine scale, and enumerate program outcomes. Furthermore, content
analysis afforded a method to categorize stated program goals for various
programs as a means of characterizing major themes across programs. While
each program exhibited a primary goal, many programs presented secondary
goals. Several programs revealed tertiary goals. From this analysis a framework
was constructed for AVR based on categorizations of articulated objectives.

Population
Seventy-five past AVR programs were identified through the literature review.
This comprehensive population is warranted to ascertain impacts of scale, as
the programs took place in varying localities. To capture a wide range of
program structures, initially the population was not further narrowed. Due to time
constraints and issues with data availability, once a more general analysis of all
75 programs was complete a smaller group samples were utilized to provide a
more in-depth analysis of AVR.

Statistical Analysis
Once characterizations of past AVR programs were made, statistical analysis
was performed on the data to determine correlations and dependencies among
program variables. Statistical analysis was performed using the following
variables:
•

Monetary (interval-ratio)

•

Minimum and Maximum Participant Incentive (interval-ratio)

•

Total Program Investment (interval-ratio)
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•

Number of Vehicles Retired (interval-ratio)

•

Program Duration (interval-ratio)

•

Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement (interval-ratio)

•

Spatial Scale of Implementation (ordinal,) and

•

Order and Type of Objective (nominal)

Hypothesis testing techniques applied to the identified variables included ttesting, Pearson’s R correlation tests, and chi-squared tests related to program
objectives. Once t-test and chi-squared tests were preformed across all 75
programs, a framework was devised based on the analysis.

Environmental Scrutiny
As there remains discrepancy over the cost of a carbon per ton across various
nations, scientific communities, and research, a more general approach was
taken to examine the environmental benefit/detriment of AVR programs. This
examination involved taking various factors affecting program performance and
testing those against program’s that provided data for the total emissions (tons)
reduction. Though air quality is impacted by a number of other factors including
both stationary sources and also climate, the examination allowed for a general
picture of what affects an AVR program might have on reducing vehicle
emissions.
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Framework Design
Once content analysis, statistical analysis, and environmental inquiries were
complete, a framework for AVR was constructed utilizing the Government
Performance and Results Act. Utilizing GPRA criteria as a template for an AVR
framework helped to determine how it might endure under performance
monitoring stipulations. In developing the framework, selected objectives were
looked at in conjunction with accompanying factors affecting program
performance.

A mixed methodology of content and statistical analysis served to yield the most
in-depth analysis possible, within time and economic constraints, for a large
population of identified programs. The methodology also allowed programs that
lacked data for a given variable used in one analysis, to be included in an
analysis for which data was available.
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ANALYSIS
Data analysis reveals much about the structure of past Accelerated Vehicle
Retirement (AVR) programs. By means of two distinct methods of research
(content analysis and statistical analysis,) the data was combined to formulate a
framework for future AVR programs. A number of tables are used at the outset of
the analysis as a means of grouping components of past programs, and to
provide a previously unavailable conglomeration of past program data.

Programs
AVR programs have been utilized in various locations for the purpose of
attaining a number of goals since the early 1990s. At least seven such programs
were introduced in California beginning in 1990, along with others in Delaware,
Colorado, Illinois, Texas, and Maine. European Union (EU) countries made use
of AVR programs throughout the mid-1990s. Deluges of new programs were
employed globally in years 2009 and 2010, coinciding with the global economic
recession.

Seventy-five past AVR programs were identified by means of content analysis of
past program implementation document, legal statutes, and past reviews and
research of completed AVR programs. As there is no current clearinghouse for
information on past AVR programs, this research will serve as a database for
future research. Throughout the data collection and content analysis process,
Google translator was employed in order to appraise documents that were in
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languages other than English. As well, currency converters were employed to
convert foreign currencies to U.S. dollars in order to aid the evaluation process.

Program Subgroups
Attributable to inconsistencies in the way data was recorded throughout
assorted waves of AVR implementations, it was prudent to categorize AVR
programs into several subgroups including:
•
•
•
•
•

Group 1:
Group 2:
Group 3:
Group 4:
Group 5:

National Programs (2009 – 2010)
California Programs (1990 – 2010)
U.S. State-Based Programs (1992 – 2010)
Canadian Programs (1996 – 2002), and
National Programs (1992 – 2000)

Tables 11 thru 15 depict programs assigned to each subgroup through content
analysis:
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Table 11: Group 1 National Programs (2009 – 2010)
Country
1 Austria
2 Canada
3 Cyprus
4 Cyprus
5 France
6 France
7 France
8 Germany
9 Greece
10 Italy
11 Ireland
12 Japan
13 Luxembourg
14 The Netherlands
15 Portugal
16 Portugal
17 Romania
18 Russia
19 Slovakia
20 Slovakia
21 Spain
22 Spain
23 United Kingdom
24 United States
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Table 12: Group 2 California Programs (1990 – 2010)
Program
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III)
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV)
5 Old Car buyback program
6 Old Car buyback program
7 Old Car buyback program
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
9 Consumer Assistance Program
10 Consumer Assistance Program
11 Consumer Assistance Program
12 Consumer Assistance Program
13 Consumer Assistance Program
14 Consumer Assistance Program
15 Consumer Assistance Program
16 REMOVE Program Phase I
17 REMOVE Program Phase II
18 REMOVE Program Phase III
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV
20 REMOVE Program Phase V
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback
27 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback
28 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program
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Table 13: Group 3 U.S. State-Based Programs (1992 – 2010)
Program
Location
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program
Delaware
2 Total Clean Cars Program
Denver, CO
3 Illinois EPA
Chicago, IL
4 Drive a Clean Machine
Texas*
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program
Maine

Table 14: Group 4 Canadian Programs (1996 – 2002)
Program
Location
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program
2 Scrap-It Program
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project

British Columbia
British Columbia
Calgary

Table 15: Group 5 National Programs (1992 – 2000)
Country
1 Denmark
2 France
3 France
4 France
5 Greece
6 Hungary
7 Spain
8 Spain
9 Ireland
10 Norway
11 Italy
12 Italy
13 Argentina
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Scale of Implementation
The scale of past AVR programs can be categorized by means of three distinct
measures: spatial, monetary, and outcome. The only ordinal variable in the
group, spatial scale, applies to the level of population where a given AVR
program was executed. Monetary scale yields three interval-ratio categories:
amount of investment, low incentive amount, and high incentive amount.
Incentive amount produced two categorizations, as often there were ranges of
incentive amounts to be earned (i.e. the U.S. CARS program offered incentives
between $3,500 and $4,500 U.S. dollars.) Finally, scale of program outcome
related to the total number of vehicles retired in a given program.

Spatial Scale
Table 16: Spatial Scale Group 1
Country
Population
Country
1 Austria
8214160 13 Luxembourg
2 Canada
33759742 14 The Netherlands
3 Cyprus
1102677 15 Portugal
4 Cyprus
1102677 16 Portugal
5 France
64768389 17 Romania
6 France
64768389 18 Russia
7 France
64768389 19 Slovakia
8 Germany
82282988 20 Slovakia
9 Greece
10749943 21 Spain
10 Italy
58090681 22 Spain
11 Ireland
4622917 23 United Kingdom
12 Japan
126804433 24 United States
(See Appendix A for citations)

80

Population
497538
16783092
10735765
10735765
21959278
139390205
5470306
5470306
46505963
46505963
62348447
310232863

Table 17: Spatial Scale Group 2
Program
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
1 (SCRAP)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
2 (SCRAP II)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
3 (SCRAP III)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
4 (SCRAP IV)
5 Old Car buyback program
6 Old Car buyback program
7 Old Car buyback program
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
Consumer Assistance Program
Consumer Assistance Program
Consumer Assistance Program
Consumer Assistance Program
Consumer Assistance Program
Consumer Assistance Program
Consumer Assistance Program
REMOVE Program Phase I
REMOVE Program Phase II
REMOVE Program Phase III
REMOVE Program Phase IV
REMOVE Program Phase V
REMOVE Program Phase VI
REMOVE Program Phase VII
REMOVE Program Phase VIII
Vehicle Buy-Back Program
Vehicle Buy-Back Program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle
26 buyback program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle
27 buyback program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle
28 buyback program
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Population
8,863,000
9,208,100
9,280,600
9,327,300
386,108 (1996)
401,690 (2001)
402,025 (2009)
9,437,290 (1999)
34,507,030 (2001)
34,507,030 (2001)
35,885,415 (2005)
36,377,534 (2007)
36,756,666 (2008)
36,961,664 (2009)
36,961,664 (2009)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
3,326,552 (2000)
7,014,896 (2005)
7,427,757 (2009)
7,427,757 (2009)
16,800,000
265, 297(July 2008)

Table 18: Spatial Scale Group 3
Program
Population (2009)
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program
863,832
2 Total Clean Cars Program
582,447
3 Illinois EPA
2,824,064
4 Drive a Clean Machine
6,002,550*
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program
1,274,923
*Dallas-Ft. Worth, Austin-Round Rock, and Houston-Galveston-Brazoria Metropolitan Statistical
Areas

(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 19: Spatial Scale Group 4
Program
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program
2 Scrap-It
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project
(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 20: Spatial Scale Group 5
Country
1 Denmark
2 France
3 France
4 France
5 Greece
6 Hungary
7 Spain
8 Spain
9 Ireland
10 Norway
11 Italy
12 Italy
13 Argentina
(See Appendix A for citations)

Population
4011375 (1999)
4530960 (2010)
1022000 (2000)

Population (July 2010 est.)
5,515,575
64,768,389
64,768,389
64,768,389
10,749,943
9,992,339
46,505,963
46,505,963
4,622,917
4,676,305
58,090,681
58,090,681
41,343,201
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Monetary Scale
A program’s monetary scale can be itemized as one of 3 distinct classifications.
Classifications include: the total dollar amount invested in a program, a
program’s minimum incentive offered to participants, and the maximum
incentive offered to program participants. Design of past AVR programs often
dictated a range of incentive amounts available to participants. For
categorization purposes the amounts were grouped as minimum and maximum.
When only one incentive amount was known, the figure was labeled as the
“maximum” incentive available. Throughout tables 21- 25, blank shaded boxes
denote unknown investment and incentive amounts. For group 5, only one
program, Hungary, had a known investment amount. All values have been
converted from local currency to U.S. dollars.

83

Table 21: Monetary Scale Group 1
1

Program
Austria

Investment
61,130,257.0

Minimum Incentive

Maximum Incentive
2037.00

2

Canada

93,216,474.9

3

Cyprus

11,546,826.0

4

Cyprus

2,716,900.30

2400.00

5

France

795,340,274.2

1358.00

6

France

428,792,147.8*

950.00

7

France

428,792,147.8*

679.00

8

Germany

6,792,250,856.8

3396.00

9

Greece

No budget

679.00

2988.00

10

Italy

1,600,000,000.00

2037.00

9509.00

11

Ireland

2590800 **

2037.00

12

Japan

4,500,942,655.00

3041.00

13

Luxembourg

13,584,501.00

2037.00

2377.00

14

The Netherlands

169,806,271.40

1000.00

2330.00

15

Portugal

30,565,128.85***

1698.00

2037.00

16

Portugal

30,565,128.85***

1358.00

1698.00

17

Romania

229,578,078.90

1212.00

18

Russia

713,875,333.00

1699.00

19

Slovakia

45,100,545.60

1358.00

2037.00

20

Slovakia

30,021,748.70

1358.00

2716.00

21

Spain

1,358,450,171.30

22

Spain

328,344,000.00

23

United Kingdom

644,379,720.00

24

United States

3,200,000,000.00

303.90
349.00

2322.00

2,716****
679.00

2716.00
3221.00

3500.00

4500.00

* France = 857,584,295.7 ÷ 2 (857584295.7 total dollars were allocated
for both programs)
** Ireland = 1,500 ! the number of vehicles scrapped (however, program
was largely revenue neutral as incentive amount was tied to a taxation
decrease)
*** Portugal = 61,130,257.70 ÷ 2 (61,130,257.70 total dollars were
allocated for both programs.
**** Interest free loan up to $13,300
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Table 22: Monetary Scale Group 2
Program

Investment

Minimum

Maximum

4

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP II)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP III)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP IV)

5

Old Car buyback program

6

Old Car buyback program

250,000

7

Old Car buyback program

~1,000,000

8

California Air Resources Board Pilot Program

9

Consumer Assistance Program

10

Consumer Assistance Program

11

Consumer Assistance Program

12

Consumer Assistance Program

21,000,000

1000

13

Consumer Assistance Program

30,000,000

1000

14

Consumer Assistance Program

41,000,000

1000

15

Consumer Assistance Program

46,139,000

1000

16

REMOVE Program Phase I

3,665,200

400

600

17

REMOVE Program Phase II

4,773,814

400

600

18

REMOVE Program Phase III

3,594,486

400

600

19

REMOVE Program Phase IV

2,688,311

400

600

20

REMOVE Program Phase V

5,309,952

400

600

21

REMOVE Program Phase VI

2,556,403

400

600

22

REMOVE Program Phase VII

2,422,741

400

600

23

REMOVE Program Phase VIII

1,210,648

400

600

24

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

1,000,000

500

25

1,000,000

500

~58,500,000*

500

~13,000,000*

650

28

Vehicle Buy-Back Program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District
vehicle buyback program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District
vehicle buyback program
Bay Area Air Quality Management District
vehicle buyback program

6,800,000

1000

29

High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)

4,000,000

1000

30

Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program
* 6.5 million per year (See Appendix A for citations)

200,000

800

1
2
3

26
27

5,000,000

700

775,000

700
700
600

930,000

500
500
800

1,000,000

1000
500
450

38,000,000

1000
1000
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Table 23: Monetary Scale Group 3
Program
1

Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program

2

Total Clean Cars Program

3

Illinois EPA

Investment

Minimum

Maximum

500
500,000.0

4

Drive a Clean Machine

5

High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program

1,000
647

902

133,753,331.2

3,000

3,500

178,517.0

1,000

2,000

(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 24: Monetary Scale Group 4
Program
1

Scrap-It Pilot Program

2

Scrap-It
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot
Project

3

Investment

Minimum

Maximum

504

757

504*

1009*
500**

* $504 toward the purchase of a bicycle (50% of purchase price to
maximum)
$504 toward a 1988 or newer vehicle
$756 toward 14 months of a 1-zone transit pass
$757 toward a new vehicle
$757 toward vanpooling
$780 toward 10 months of a 2-zone transit pass
$824 toward 8 months of a 3-zone transit pass
$1009 toward a new natural gas vehicle
**12 free consecutive monthly transit passes ($504 value)
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Table 25: Monetary Scale Group 5
Investment
Country
1 Denmark
2 France
3 France
4 France
5 Greece
454,000
6 Hungary
7 Spain
8 Spain
9 Ireland
10 Norway
11 Italy
12 Italy
520,946,723.97
13 Argentina
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Minimum

1033

692.97
692.97

1049
874
996

Maximum
1184.12
413
1033
1446
506.56
814.55
814.55
1610.40
864
1399
1049
4,482

Scale of Outcome
The number of vehicles retired in each program varied considerably. A number
of variables that may have influenced fluctuations of a program’s direct outcome
will be discussed throughout the analysis. Tables 26 thru 31 detail the scale of
results for each program:

Table 26: Scale of Outcome Group 1
Country
Number of Vehicles Retired
1 Austria
30,000
2 Canada
118,980
3 Cyprus
10,039
4 Cyprus
1,100
5 France
600,000
6 France
200,000
7 France
300,000
8 Germany
2,000,000
9 Greece
70,000
10 Italy
856,000
11 Ireland
17,272
12 Japan
748,000
13 Luxembourg
52000
14 The Netherlands
56,900
15 Portugal
32,500
16 Portugal
8,875
17 Romania
190,000
18 Russia
230,000
19 Slovakia
22,100
20 Slovakia
22,100
21 Spain
260,000
22 Spain
70,000
23 United Kingdom
400,000
24 United States
677, 842
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Table 27: Scale of Outcome Group 2

Program
1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III)
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV)
5 Old Car buyback program 1
6 Old Car buyback program 2
7 Old Car buyback program 3
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
9 Consumer Assistance Program 1
10 Consumer Assistance Program 2
11 Consumer Assistance Program 3
12 Consumer Assistance Program 4
13 Consumer Assistance Program 5
14 Consumer Assistance Program 6
15 Consumer Assistance Program 7
16 REMOVE Program Phase I
17 REMOVE Program Phase II
18 REMOVE Program Phase III
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV
20 REMOVE Program Phase V
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program
26 BAAQMD vehicle buyback
27 BAAQMD vehicle buyback
28 BAAQMD vehicle buyback
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Number of
Vehicles
Retired
8367
502
335
11167
1,200
350
1,400
1,001
7,000
34,003
~4000
16,900
21,909
22,331
45,000

~2,100
~2,100
24,300
5,400
15,600
370
200

Table 28: Scale of Outcome Group 3

Program
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program
2 Total Clean Cars Program
3 Illinois EPA
4 Drive a Clean Machine
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program
(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 29: Scale of Outcome Group 4
Program
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program
2 Scrap-It
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project
* As of 7/1/2010
(See Appendix A for citations)

Number of
Vehicles Retired
125
271
207
41,671
62

Number of Vehicles Retired
1,000
25000 *
600

Table 30: Scale of Outcome Group 5

Number of Vehicles
Program
Retired
1 Denmark
Unknown*
2 France
3 France
750,000**
4 France
750,000**
5 Greece
59,540
6 Hungary
~150,000
7 Spain
211,000
8 Spain
146,000
9 Ireland
59540
10 Norway
150,000
11 Italy
1,148,000
12 Italy
13 Argentina
103,532
*100,000 in first 6 months, though program lasted nearly a year and a half.
**1,500,000 for both programs
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Program Duration
Program duration was calculated by first finding the number of days between a
program’s start and end date. The number of days between a program’s start
and end date was then divided by 30.5 - the approximate average number of
days in a given month. Duration values represent the approximate number of
months of a program’s tenure. Several programs are ongoing and were
analyzed based on program performance thus far. When a program was
ongoing an end date of 3/1/2011 was used. For an exact list of program dates,
see Table 6.
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Table 31: Program Duration Group 1
Country

! 1 Austria

Duration
(Months)
8.23

2

Canada

25.42

3

Cyprus

7.84

4

Cyprus

2.03

5

France

12.65

6

France

5.81

7

France

5.90

8

Germany

11.32

9

Greece

1.06

10

Italy

10.55

11

Ireland

11.71

12

Japan

9.19

13

Luxembourg

8.13

14

The Netherlands

18.74

15

Portugal

7.00

16

Portugal

4.70

17

Romania

9.10

18

Russia

9.60

19

Slovakia

0.50

20

Slovakia

8.70

21

Spain

21.60

22

Spain

11.60

23

United Kingdom

10.80

24

United States

1.70

(See Appendix A for citations)
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Table 32: Program Duration Group 2
Program
Duration
! 1 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)
4.48
2 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)
3 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III)
4 Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV)
5 Old Car buyback program
35.32
6 Old Car buyback program
39.26
7 Old Car buyback program
58.87
8 California Air Resources Board Pilot Program
12.71
9 Consumer Assistance Program
41.16
10 Consumer Assistance Program
5.90
11 Consumer Assistance Program
47.10
12 Consumer Assistance Program
11.74
13 Consumer Assistance Program
11.74
14 Consumer Assistance Program
7.16
15 Consumer Assistance Program
22.26
16 REMOVE Program Phase I
11.77
17 REMOVE Program Phase II
11.77
18 REMOVE Program Phase III
11.77
19 REMOVE Program Phase IV
11.77
20 REMOVE Program Phase V
11.77
21 REMOVE Program Phase VI
11.77
22 REMOVE Program Phase VII
11.77
23 REMOVE Program Phase VIII
11.77
24 Vehicle Buy-Back Program
11.77
25 Vehicle Buy-Back Program
11.77
26 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback
171.81
27 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback
116.94
28 Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback
35.32
29 High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)
23.52
30 Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program
22.55
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Table 33: Program Duration Group 3
Program
Duration
!1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program
12
2 Total Clean Cars Program
0.5
3 Illinois EPA
12
4 Drive a Clean Machine
35.3
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program
11.1
(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 34: Program Duration Group 4
Program
Duration
!1 Scrap-It Pilot Program
332.38
2 Scrap-It
142.58
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project
12.09
(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 35: Program Duration Group 5
Program Duration
! 1 Denmark
17.58
2 France
3 France
16.58
4 France
12.74
5 Greece
26.45
6 Hungary
4.94
7 Spain
5.90
8 Spain
6.84
9 Ireland
35.16
10 Norway
11.77
11 Italy
8.77
12 Italy
7.77
13 Argentina
19.45
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement
Past AVR programs stipulate that age of a vehicle must be at least a certain
specified age in order to be eligible to participate in a given program. Minimum
vehicle age values represent the minimum allowable age a of a vehicle to
participate.

Table 36: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 1
Country
Minimum Vehicle Age
!1

Austria

13.0

2

Canada

15.0

3

Cyprus

15.0

4

Cyprus

15.0

5

France

10.0

6

France

10.0

7

France

10.0

8

Germany

9.0

9

Greece

9.0

10

Italy

9.0

11

Ireland

10.0

12

Japan

13.0

13

Luxembourg

10.0

14

The Netherlands

15

Portugal

10.0

16

Portugal

8.0

17

Romania

13.0

18

Russia

10.0

19

Slovakia

10.0

20

Slovakia

10.0

21

Spain

10.0

22

Spain

10.0

23

United Kingdom

10.0

24 United States
(See Appendix A for citations

9.0

8
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Table 37: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 2
Min. Vehicle Age

1

Program
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)

2

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)

21.0

3

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III)

22.0

4

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV)

21.0

5

Old Car buyback program

21.0

6

Old Car buyback program

26.0

7

Old Car buyback program

14.0

8

California Air Resources Board Pilot Program

18.0

9

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

10

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

11

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

12

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

13

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

14

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

15

Consumer Assistance Program

Not Applicable*

16

REMOVE Program Phase I

11.0

17

REMOVE Program Phase II

12.0

18

REMOVE Program Phase III

13.0

19

REMOVE Program Phase IV

14.0

20

REMOVE Program Phase V

15.0

21

REMOVE Program Phase VI

16.0

22

REMOVE Program Phase VII

17.0

23

REMOVE Program Phase VIII

18.0

24

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

19.0

25

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

20.0

26

Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback

12.0

27

Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback

22.0

28

Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback

20.0

29

High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)

Not Applicable*

30

Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program

19.0

*Not a requirement, instead must fail smog check
(See Appendix A for citations)
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18.0

Table 38: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 3
Program
1 Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program
2 Total Clean Cars Program
3 Illinois EPA
4 Drive a Clean Machine
5 High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program
(See Appendix A for citations)

Minimum Vehicle Age
12.0
12.0
13.0
10.0
13.0

Table 39: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 4
Program
Minimum Vehicle Age
1 Scrap-It Pilot Program
9.0
2 Scrap-It
4.0
3 Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project 13.0
(See Appendix A for citations)

Table 40: Minimum Vehicle Age Group 5
Program Minimum Vehicle Age
1 Denmark
2 France
3 France
10.0
4 France
8.0
5 Greece
10.0
6 Hungary
Not applicable
7 Spain
10.0
8 Spain
7.0
9 Ireland
10.0
10 Norway
10.0
11 Italy
Not applicable
12 Italy
Not applicable
13 Argentina
10.0
(See Appendix A for citations)
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Factors Affecting Program Performance
Five factors affecting program performance are detailed in tables 6 - 20
including:
•

Total Monetary Investment

•

Minimum Participant Incentive Amount

•

Maximum Participant Incentive Amount

•

Program Duration, and

•

Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement.

As each factor can be measured at the interval-ratio level, statistical techniques
were employed to determine correlations between variables. By means of
calculating Pearson’s r, the coefficient of determination (r2,) and the slope
between different variables, the analysis sought to answer three questions: Is
there a relationship between the variables? How strong is the relationship? What
is the direction of the relationship? Calculations are summarized for each
variable across all groups in Tables 41-51 and by program subgroup in
Appendix B.

Pearson’s r, or the correlation coefficient, is a measure of the association
between to interval-ratio variables and varies from 0.00 to ±1.00. A value of 0.00
indicates no association. A value of ±1.00 would indicate a perfect positive or
negative relationship. How closely a measure approaches the extremes can be
described as “weak” or “strong.” The coefficient of determination can be
interpreted as how much our x variable increases our facility to predict or
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explain y. Finally, our calculated slope (b) indicates that for each unit change in

x there is an increase or decrease of b units in y (Healey 2005 402-409).

Because data available on factors affecting program performance is based on
data from a random sample from all AVR programs, it is necessary to test our
calculated r values for significance. For all inspections we assume: random
sampling, an interval-ratio level of measurement, bivariate normal distributions, a
linear relationship, homoscedasticity, and that our sampling distribution is
normal. Our null hypothesis is that there is no linear association between the two
variables in the population from which the sample was drawn. Our sampling
distribution is a t distribution, with an Alpha of 0.05. After measures of
association were calculated, each measure was then tested for significance.

Interrogating the relationship between monetary factors can help determine
whether or not the benefit of conducting a program was commensurate with the
cost of a given program, in terms of the total cost and participant incentive
amounts. Investigating the relationship between minimum vehicle age
requirement and other factors can help to determine the appropriate vehicle age
stipulation for future programs. Finally, exploring the relationship between
program duration and other factors can help to determine the appropriate length
of an AVR program. The following analysis scrutinizes each factor across all
programs in order to gauge a program’s effectiveness. The relationship between
two given variables will be analyzed one time. As our investigations progress,
each new table will fail to repeat an analysis explained in a previous section.
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Number of Vehicles Retired
Intuitively, all AVR programs endeavor to retire the maximum number of vehicles
possible in a given location. The number of vehicles retired by a given program
provides a window as to how various program variables effect program
participation. The following analysis examines how the number of vehicles

retired by a program is affected by that program’s total monetary investment,
minimum and maximum participant incentive, length of duration, and minimum
vehicle age requirement?

Note that throughout the analysis our sample size N fluctuates as assorted
factors affecting program performance are measured for association. Lack of
data and inconsistencies in the way various programs recorded information are
to be blamed for the fluctuation. Ideally, known past AVR programs would have
provided consistent data in order to afford a must accurate analysis. In spite of
this, analysis was consistent and sample sizes are annotated in each variable
row
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Table 41: Correlation Summary - Number of Vehicles Retired
Factor
Total Monetary
Investment
Minimum
Incentive

Correlation
Coefficient

Coefficient of
Determination

% of variance
explained by
factor

N

Slope

0.868635787

86.8

53

0.000255

0.090540273

9.1

22

124.32

0.37532284

37.5

63

88.02

0.01839520

0.1

61

!1008.05"

0.05628964

5.6

54

-47904.70

Correlation
Strong,
Positively linear
0.9320
Weak,
Positively linear
0.3008
Moderately
Maximum
strong,
Incentive
Positively linear
0.6126
Weak,
Program
Negatively
Duration
linear
-0.1356
Weak,
Minimum
Negatively
Vehicle Age
linear
-0.2372
(See Appendix A for included & excluded programs)

Table 42: Significance Summary – Factors Affecting the Total Number of Vehicles Retired
#$"
%%"
&$"
&'"
#("
!"#""
Total Monetary
Minimum
Maximum
Program
Minimum Vehicle Age
Investment
Incentive
Incentive
Duration
Requirement
2.015
2.086
1.996
2.001
2.006
t (critical)
17.051
1.411
6.053
-1.761
!1.051"
t (obtained)
Statistical
Significance to Total
!
!
!
"
"
AVR Population
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs)

!
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Summary
The number of vehicles retired by a given program can be affected by factors
including: the total monetary investment in a program, the minimum and
maximum participant incentive amount offered by a program, a program’s
duration, and the minimum vehicle age eligibility requirement stipulated by a
program. While all factors were proven to affect program performance, even
though program duration and minimum vehicle age requirement were related in
the sample there is not enough evidence to conclude the variables are also
related in the population, and may have occurred by chance alone.

Total Monetary Investment
The total amount of monetary investment in a program can affect a program’s
performance. Greater investment should effect greater participation. The
following analysis examines what impact a program’s total monetary investment

has on the number of vehicles retired, the individual incentive amount offered,
the length of a program, and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement?
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Table 43: Correlation Summary - Total Monetary Investment
Coefficient
% of
Correlation
of
variance
Factor
Correlation
Coefficient Determinatio
explained
n
by factor
weak,
Minimum
0.6687
0.4471
44.7
Incentive
positively linear
Maximum
moderately strong,
0.4581
0.209881
20.9
Incentive
positively linear
weak,
Program
-0.1258
0.0158
1.5
Duration
negatively linear
Minimum
weak,
Vehicle
-0.3125
0.0977
9.7
negatively linear
Age
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs)

N

Slope

22

559245.8

54

354519.5

61

-8337283.6

47

-89868429.5

!
Table 44: Significance Summary – Factors Affecting the Total Monetary Investment
""!
#$!
$#!
$%!
!"#""
Minimum
Maximum
Program
Minimum Vehicle Age
Incentive
Incentive
Duration
Requirement
2.086
2.066
2.0167
2.0141
t (critical)
4.021
3.716
-.0831
-2.206
t (obtained)
Statistical Significance to Total AVR
!
!
"
!
Population
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs)
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Summary
The total monetary investment in a given AVR program can be affected by
factors including: the minimum and maximum participant incentive amount
offered by a program, a program’s duration, and the minimum vehicle age
eligibility requirement stipulated by a program. The total monetary investment in
a given AVR program can affect the number of vehicles retired by program.
Though program duration and total monetary investment were related in our
sample, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the variables are also
related in the population, and that our sample value may have occurred by
chance alone.

Minimum Incentive Amount
The minimum incentive amount offered by a program can affect a program’s
performance. Greater incentives, for minimum participation requirements,
should effect greater participation. The following analysis examines what

relationship exists between the minimum incentive amount offered by a
program, the number of vehicles retired in a program, a program’s total
monetary investment, the maximum incentive amount offered, the length of a
program, and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement?

!
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Table 45: Correlation Summary - Minimum Incentive Amount
Correlation
Coefficient of
Variable
Correlation
Coefficient
Determination
Maximum
moderately strong,
Incentive
positively linear
0.6176
0.392792
Program
weak,
Duration
negatively linear
-0.1524
0.02325
Minimum
weak,
Vehicle Age
negatively linear
-0.3562
.126898
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs)

%

N

Slope

39.3

31

.265898

.02

31

-1.87742

12.6

29

-81.8553

Table 46: Significance Summary – Factors Affecting the Minimum Incentive Amount
!"#
!"#
$%#
!"#""
Maximum
Program
Minimum Vehicle Age
Incentive
Duration
Requirement
2.0452
2.0452
2.0518
t (critical)
3.352
-.8308
-1.980
t (obtained)
Statistical Significance to Total AVR
!
"
"
Population
(See Appendix A for included and excluded programs)

!
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Summary
The minimum incentive amount offered by an AVR program can be affected by
factors including: the total monetary investment in a program, the maximum
participant incentive amount offered by a program, a program’s duration, and
the minimum vehicle age eligibility requirement stipulated by a program. The
minimum incentive amount offered can affect the number of vehicles retired by
program. While program duration and minimum vehicle age requirement were
related to a program’s minimum incentive amount in the sample there is not
sufficient evidence to believe that the variable are also related in the population,
and our sample r value may have occurred by chance.

Maximum Incentive Amount
The maximum incentive amount offered by a program can affect program
performance. Greater incentives, for fulfilling maximum participation
requirements, should effect greater participation. The following analysis
examines what relationship exists between the maximum incentive amount

offered by a program, the number of vehicles retired in a program, a program’s
total monetary investment, the minimum incentive amount offered, the length of
a program, and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement?

!
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Table 47: Correlation Summary - Maximum Incentive Amount
Correlation
Coefficient of
Variable
Correlation
Coefficient
Determination
Program
weak,
Duration
negatively linear
-0.1524
0.02325
Minimum
weak,
Vehicle Age
negatively linear
-0.3562
.126898
(See Appendix A for included & excluded programs)

%

N

Slope

.02

31

1.8485

12.6

29

-101.51

Table 48: Significance Summary – Factors Affecting the Maximum Incentive Amount
!"#
$%#
!"#""
Program Duration
Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement
1.9955
1.9983
t (critical)
-.0538
-2.86902
t (obtained)
!
"
Statistical Significance to Total AVR Population
(See Appendix A for included & excluded programs)

!
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Summary
The maximum incentive amount offered by an AVR program can be affected by
factors including: the total monetary investment in a program, the minimum
participant incentive amount offered by a program, a program’s duration, and
the minimum vehicle age eligibility requirement stipulated by a program. The
maximum incentive amount offered can affect the number of vehicles retired by
program. While program duration and the maximum incentive amount offered by
a program were related in our sample, there is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that the variables are also related in the population, and may have
occurred by chance.

Program Duration
A program’s duration can affect program performance. The following analysis
examines how the duration of a given program affects the number of vehicles

retired, the total monetary investment, the individual incentive amount offered,
and a program’s minimum vehicle age requirement?

Table 1: Correlation Summary - Program Duration
Variable
Minimum Vehicle Age

Correlation
weak,
negatively
linear

Correlation
Coefficient

Coefficient of
Determination

%

N

Slope

-0.3562

.126898

12.6

29

-81.8553

(See Appendix A for excluded programs)

!
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Table 50: Significance Summary – Factors Affecting Program Duration

!"#""

t (critical)
t (obtained)
Statistical Significance to Total AVR
Population
(See Appendix A for excluded programs)

65
Minimum Vehicle Age
Requirement
1.9983
-.4666
!

Summary
A programs duration can be affected by factors including: the total monetary
investment offered by a program, the minimum and maximum participant
incentive amount offered by a program, and the minimum vehicle age eligibility
requirement stipulated by a program. Program duration can affect the number of
vehicles retired by a program. While program duration and minimum vehicle
age requirement were related in our sample, there is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that the variables are also related in the population, and may have
occurred by chance.

Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement
A program’s minimum vehicle age requirement can affect program
performance. The following analysis examines how the minimum vehicle age

requirement stipulated by a given program affects the number of vehicles
retired, the total monetary investment, the individual incentive amount offered,
and the duration of a given program?
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The relationship, and the significance of the relationship, between a programs
minimum vehicle age requirement and its relationship to a programs
performance and between other factors affecting program performance has
been explained in the previous sections. The following section summarizes the
relationships for six factors effecting program performance.

Summary
Correlations exist between the number of vehicles retied by an AVR program, an
AVR program’s total monetary investment, the minimum and maximum incentive
amount offered by a program, a program’s duration, and the minimum vehicle
age requirement stipulated by a program. Our analysis details the strength and
direction of the relationship of factors affecting program performance to the
number of vehicles retired, and relationships among individual factors. We note
that the monetary scale of a program is positively related to a program’s
outcome. With greater investment and offered incentives, a greater number of
vehicles will be retired.

Both program duration and minimum vehicle age are negatively associated with
program performance. While the two negatively associated factors appear to be
not statistically relevant to the total population through our analysis, both factors
represent a large portion of the total population. Qualitatively, we might explain
the negative association between the length of a program’s duration and the
number of vehicles retired by reflecting on the initial excitement surrounding the
2009 U.S. CARS program. Though the program was extended once to
accommodate willing participants, it retired almost 700,000 vehicles in a mere

110

two months. We can conjecture that the sense of urgency present during the
program’s short duration might not have sustained for a much longer period of
time. We also see that as the minimum vehicle age requirement set by a
program increases, the number of vehicles retired decreases. We Innately
understand that vehicles wear with age, and thus a smaller amount of older
vehicles than newer vehicles will always be present. Extending the minimum
vehicle age requirement ensures that there are less cars available to participate.

Table 51 relates interrelationships across AVR programs for six factors affecting
program performance:
Table 51: Correlation Matrix – Interrelationships for factors affecting program performance

1
Number of
Vehicles
Retired
1
2
3
4
5
6

Number of
Vehicles
Retired
Investment
Minimum
Incentive
Maximum
Incentive
Program
Duration
Minimum
Vehicle
Age

2
Investment

3

4

5

Minimum
Incentive

Maximum
Incentive

Program
Duration

6
Minimum
Vehicle
Age

1.00

0.93

0.30

0.61

-0.03

-0.24

0.93

1.00

0.67

0.46

-0.13

-0.31

0.30

0.67

1.00

0.63

-0.15

-0.36

0.61

0.46

0.63

1.00

-0.06

-0.34

-0.03

-0.13

-0.15

-0.06

1.00

-0.06

-0.24

-0.31

-0.36

-0.34

-0.06

1.00

Other factors affecting program performance
While various insights can be taken from correlations derived from data
collected for this analysis, other outstanding factors can affect program
performance. In light of the current global economic crisis, a trigger for the
commencement of several programs included in this analysis, it is apparent that
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economic cycles may play a roll in how well a program performs. How much of
a role an economic cycle might play in an AVR program’s performance is
outside the realm of this analysis. However, we can conclude that many of the
program’s included in Group 1 would not have occurred were it not for an
economic downswing.

Existing auto ownership might also factor in whether or not an AVR program
performs effectively. Consider a population where a majority of the residents
utilize public transit or areas where strict emissions regulations dictate that
residents will not keep vehicles past prime running condition, to understand this
occurrence. Simply put, if great numbers of vehicles do not exist in an area
where a program is conducted, program performance will suffer.

Hand in hand with existing auto ownership are cultural factors. Again, these
factors are outside the realm of this analysis, but we know that different cultures
place different values on personal vehicles. Many cultures are auto averse, and
seek other means of travel whenever possible. Other cultures view personal
vehicles as a mark of prestige. Still others view the very cars likely eligible for an
AVR program as “classics,” and decline participation in an AVR program,
whereas other “green” cultures might readily participate. In personal
conversations throughout this analysis, several people offered reservations
about the ecological ramifications of retiring a “clunker” for a new vehicle.
Mentioned in the literature review of this analysis, emissions are expended
during automobile production. Reservations stem from the likelihood that an
older, well-running vehicle might still produce fewer emissions than those
incurred during vehicle production.
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Finally, the availability of information about a program may also affect program
performance. While the 2009 U.S. Cash-for-clunkers program received
extensive initial coverage by the national news media, program details were
opaque well after the program’s commencement. How a program markets itself
to the general public may play a major role in choice of scores of participants,
qualified or not, to travel to dealerships or other program locations. As well, we
must assume that a sector of would-be program participants do not have
internet access. Websites such as www.cars.gov and www.retireyourride.ca
provide a wealth of information, but are useless to participants without
computers and/or internet access. Programs might alleviate this issue by
capitalizing on traditional media sources. A final note about the availability of
information deals with those participants with internet access. Through data
collection, several websites were discovered to be user-unfriendly. Information
about a program housed in a hard to navigate website is of little value to
participants.
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Articulated objectives
Identified past AVR programs proposed articulated objectives, toward which, a
program’s implementation was intended to execute. Each of the seventy-five
programs had at least one articulated objective. A number of the identified
programs proposed a secondary objective in addition to the primary articulated
objective. A handful of identified programs had tertiary objectives in addition to
the primary and secondary objectives.

Articulated objectives were categorized first by the order of objective (assuming
emphasis) and again by objective type. Objective types can be broadly defined
as those having to do with vehicle sales (economic,) those concerned with
reducing air pollution (environmental,) and those interested in road safety
(safety.) By and large the most recent (2009-2010) AVR programs have been
primarily concerned with economic benefits that may occur as a result of an
AVR program’s implementation. However, the primary objective of many state
based programs, especially those in California, have historically centered on
environmental concerns.

Order of Objectives
The order in which objectives were identified for a particular program assumes
emphasis. Even though objectives were sometimes stated in ways that insinuate
equality between objectives, our analysis assumes a ranking. (See NHTSA 2009
p 2.: “The CARS program achieved the objectives set out by Congress to
increase automotive sales and aid the environment.”) Ranking the objectives
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provided a way to delineate primary, secondary, and tertiary objectives. A
breakdown of ranked identifiable objectives includes:
•

Sixty-eight of the seventy-five programs listed at least one objective

•

Only six of the seventy-five programs had no identifiable objective

•

Fifty-one programs listed a single “primary objective

•

Twenty-four programs listed a “secondary” objective in addition to the
“primary” objective

•

Seven programs listed a “tertiary” objective

Tables 52-56 detail the order of objectives from past AVR programs
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Table 52: Order of Objectives – Group 1
1

Country
Austria

Primary Objective
Stimulate Auto Industry

Secondary Objective
Reduce Pollutant Emissions

Tertiary Objective

2

Canada

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

3

Cyprus

Road Safety

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

Stimulate Auto Industry

4

Cyprus

Road Safety

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

Stimulate Auto Industry

5

France

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

6

France

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

7

France

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

8

Germany

Stimulate Auto Industry

9

Greece

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

10

Italy

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

11

Ireland

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

12

Japan

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

13

Luxembourg

Reduce CO2 emissions

Stimulate Auto Industry

14

The Netherlands

Reduce CO2 emissions

Stimulate Auto Industry

15

Portugal

Reduce CO2 emissions

Road Safety

16

Portugal

Reduce CO2 emissions

Road Safety

17

Romania

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

18

Russia

Stimulate Auto Industry

19

Slovakia

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

Road Safety

20

Slovakia

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

Road Safety

21

Spain

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce CO2 Emissions

Road Safety

22

Spain

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce CO2 Emissions

Road Safety

23

United Kingdom

Stimulate Auto Industry

Road Safety

24

United States

Stimulate Auto Industry

Reduce CO2 Emissions

(See Appendix A for Citations)
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Road Safety

Table 53: Order of Objectives - Group 2
Program
1
2
3
4

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP II)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP III)
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP IV)

5

Old Car buyback program

6

Old Car buyback program

7

Old Car buyback program

8

California Air Resources Board Pilot
Program

9

Consumer Assistance Program

10

Consumer Assistance Program

11

Consumer Assistance Program

12

Consumer Assistance Program

13

Consumer Assistance Program

14

Consumer Assistance Program

15

Consumer Assistance Program

Primary
Objective

Program

Generate MERC's*

16

REMOVE Program Phase I

Generate MERC's

17

REMOVE Program Phase II

Generate MERC's

18

REMOVE Program Phase III

Generate MERC's

19

REMOVE Program Phase IV

20

REMOVE Program Phase V

21

REMOVE Program Phase VI

22

REMOVE Program Phase VII

23

REMOVE Program Phase VIII

24

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

25

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions

28

Bay Area Air Quality Management
District vehicle buyback
Bay Area Air Quality Management
District vehicle buyback
Bay Area Air Quality Management
District vehicle buyback

29

High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)

30

Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program

26
27

(See Appendix A for Citations)
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Primary
Objective
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions
Reduce Pollutant
Emissions

Table 54: Order of Objectives - Group 3
Program

Primary Objective

1

Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program

Offset increased HC Emissions

2

Total Clean Cars Program

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

3

Illinois EPA

Reduce Criteria Pollutant Emissions

4

Drive a Clean Machine

Reduce Pollutant Emissions in Counties with Ground Level O-Zone

5

High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

(See Appendix A for Citations)

Table 55: Order of Objectives - Group 4
Program

Primary Objective

1

Scrap-It Pilot Program

Reduce greenhouse gas emissions

2

Scrap-It

Reduce greenhouse gas emissions

3

Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project

Reduce criteria air contaminants

(See Appendix A for Citations)

118

Secondary Objective

Reduce greenhouse gas emissions

Table 56: Order of Objectives - Group 5
1

Country

Primary Objective

2

Denmark

Reduce HC and NO x emissions

Secondary Objective

3

France

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

4

France

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

5

France

Reduce Pollutant Emissions

6

Greece

Reduce Average Vehicle Age

Improve Emission Technology embodied in Vehicle Fleet

7

Hungary

Eliminate old two-stroke engine vehicles

Reduce criteria pollutant emissions

8

Spain

9

Spain

10

Ireland

11

Norway

12

Italy

13

Italy

14

Argentina

Stimulate Vehicle Sales

(See Appendix A for citations)
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Type of Objective
Objectives listed by individual programs can be further broken down by
objective type. Recent programs have focused primarily upon stimulating auto
sales, with a secondary focus on reducing air pollution. Programs held at the
state-level throughout the 1990’s concentrated primarily on environmental issues
in accordance with an idea proposed in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
that stated entities could reduce emissions in one area of an AQMD, if the total
emissions reduction remedied high pollution in another area (Washington 1993
1). A handful of European programs have centered on country specific
tribulations such as road safety (Cyprus) and the elimination of two-stroke
engines (Hungary.)

Objectives were categorized first by order of objective, and secondly by
objective type. Tables 57-61detail type of objective by program:

!
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Table 57: Objective Type - Group 1
Country

Primary Objective Type

Secondary Objective Type

1

Austria

Economic

Environmental

2

Canada

Environmental

3

Cyprus

Other

Environmental

Economic

Other

Environmental

Economic

4

Cyprus

Tertiary Objective Type

5

France

Economic

Environmental

6

France

Economic

Environmental

7

France

Economic

Environmental

8

Germany

Economic

9

Greece

Economic

Environmental

10

Italy

Economic

Environmental

11

Ireland

Economic

Environmental

12

Japan

Economic

Environmental

13

Luxembourg

Environmental

Economic

14

The Netherlands

Environmental

Economic

15

Portugal

Environmental

Other

16

Portugal

Environmental

Other

17

Romania

Economic

Environmental

18

Russia

Economic

19

Slovakia

Economic

Environmental

Other
Other

Other

20

Slovakia

Economic

Environmental

21

Spain

Economic

Environmental

Other

22

Spain

Economic

Environmental

Other

23

United Kingdom

Economic

Other

24

United States

Economic

Environmental

(See Appendix A for Citations)

!
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Table 58: Objective Type - Group 2
1

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)

2

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)

Primary Objective
Type
Environmental
Environmental

3

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III)

Environmental

4

Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV)

Environmental

5

Old Car buyback program

Environmental

6

Old Car buyback program

Environmental

7

Old Car buyback program

Environmental

8

California Air Resources Board Pilot Program

Environmental

9

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

10

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

11

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

12

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

13

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

14

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

15

Consumer Assistance Program

Environmental

16

REMOVE Program Phase I

Environmental

17

REMOVE Program Phase II

Environmental

18

REMOVE Program Phase III

Environmental

19

REMOVE Program Phase IV

Environmental

20

REMOVE Program Phase V

Environmental

21

REMOVE Program Phase VI

Environmental

22

REMOVE Program Phase VII

Environmental

23

REMOVE Program Phase VIII

Environmental

24

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

Environmental

25

Vehicle Buy-Back Program

Environmental

26

Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback

Environmental

27

Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback

Environmental

28

Bay Area Air Quality Management District vehicle buyback

Environmental

29

High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)

Environmental

30

Old Car Buyback and Scrap Program

Environmental

Program

(See Appendix A for Citations)
For all programs in Group 2 no secondary or tertiary objectives were identified.

!
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Table 59: Objective Type Group 3
Program

Primary Objective

1

Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program

2

Total Clean Cars Program

Environmental
Environmental

3

Illinois EPA

4

Drive a Clean Machine

5

High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program

Environmental
Environmental
Environmental

(See Appendix B for Citations)
For all programs in Group 3 and no secondary or tertiary objectives were
identified.
Table 60: Objective Type Group 4
Program

Primary Objective

1

Scrap-It Pilot Program

Environmental

2

Scrap-It

Environmental

3

Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project

Environmental

Secondary Objective

Environmental

(See Appendix A for Citations)
No tertiary objectives were identified for programs in Group 4.
Table 61: Objective Type Group 5
1

Country
Denmark

Primary Objective
Environmental

Secondary Objective

2

France

Environmental

3

France

Environmental

4

France

Environmental

5

Greece

Other

Environmental

6

Hungary

Other

Environmental

7

Spain

8

Spain

9

Ireland

10

Norway

11

Italy

13

Italy

14

Argentina

Economic

(See Appendix A for Citations)
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Tests
Using Chi Square, objectives were assessed for independence against several
program variables. For each model we assume independent random samples, a
nominal level of measurement, and a null hypothesis that the two variables are
independent. Appendix B. dictates those programs excluded from each test.

Test 1: Type of Objective and Order of Objective
Our first test was to determine if the order in which a program articulates its
objectives is dependent on the type of objective. Objectives were categorized
by type and by the order in which they were stated.
Table 62: Type of Objective by Order of Objective of all AVR
Programs
Order of Objective
Type of Objective Primary Secondary Tertiary Totals
Economic
18
2
2
22
Environmental
47
18
4
69
Safety
2
2
5
9
Other
2
1
0
3
Totals
69
23
11
103
Expected frequencies were then obtained for both variables:
Table 63: Expected Frequencies for Table 62
Order of
Objective
Type of
Secondar
Objective
Primary
y
Tertiary
Economic
14.74
4.91
2.35
Environmental
46.22
15.41
7.37
Safety
6.03
2.01
0.96
Other
2.01
0.67
0.32
Totals
69
23
11
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Totals
22
69
9
3
103

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 6
x2(critical) = 12.592
x2(obtained) =24.63
Our test statistic of 24.63 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell
frequencies in Table 62 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The
variables are dependent. Based on the data, the probability that the order in
which an AVR program articulates its objectives is dependent on the type of
objective articulated. Table 64 helps to make this relationship more obvious.
Table 64: Percentages for Table 62
Order of Objective
Type of Objective
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Economic
26.08%
8.69%
18.18%
Environmental
68.11%
78.26%
36.36%
Safety
2.89%
8.69%
45.45%
Other
2.89%
4.34%
0.00%
Totals
100%
100%
100%

Totals
21.35%
66.90%
8.73%
2.91%
100%

The primary objective listed by a program is approximately 42% more likely to
be an environmental objective rather than an economic objective. Whereas an
economic objective is approximately 17% more likely to be the primary objective
articulated by program rather than a secondary objective. According to these
results, environmental objectives are more apt to be articulated as both primary
and secondary objectives, while safety objectives are most likely to be a
program’s articulated tertiary objective.
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Test 2: Program Performance by Order and Type of Objective
The second test was to determine whether or not a program’s performance was
dependent on the order and type of articulated objective. Program performance
was ranked as low, average, and high based on the number of vehicles retired.
Primary objectives were first tested against 59 programs that listed a primary
objective.

Table 65: AVR Program Performance by Primary Objective
Primary Objective
Program Performance
Economic
Environmental
Other
High
12
3
1
Average
5
10
1
Low
1
24
2
Totals
18
37
4

Totals
16
16
27
59

Expected frequencies were then obtained for both variables
Table 66: Expected Frequencies for Table 65
Primary Objective
Program Performance Economic
Environmental
High
4.88
10.03
Average
4.88
10.03
Low
8.23
16.93
Totals
18
37

Other
1.08
1.08
1.83
4

Totals
16
16
27
59

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) =24.65
Our test statistic of 24.65 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell
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frequencies in Table 65 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s performance is
dependent on its stated primary objective. Table 67 helps to make this
relationship more obvious.
Table 67: Percentages for Table 65
Primary Objective
Program Performance Economic
Environmental
High
66.66
8.10
Average
27.77
27.02
Low
5.55
64.86
Totals
100
100

Other
25
25
50
100

Totals
27.11
27.11
45.76
100

Approximately 67% of high performing programs articulate economic primary
objectives vs. 8% of programs with environmental primary objectives. For
average performing programs the type of primary objective does not seem to
bear much concern. However, programs with the lowest performance only state
an economic primary objective 5% of the time, insinuating that programs with
economic primary objectives perform better than those with other primary
objectives.

Secondary objectives were then tested against 27 programs with an articulated
secondary objective.
Table 68: AVR Program Performance by Secondary Objective
Secondary Objective
Program Performance
Economic
Environmental
Other
High
0
9
1
Average
2
5
2
Low
2
4
2
Totals
4
18
5
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Totals
10
9
8
27

Expected frequencies were derived for both variables:
Table 69: Expected Frequencies for Table 68
Secondary Objective
Program Performance
Economic
Environmental
High
1.48
6.66
Average
1.33
6
Low
1.18
5.33
Totals
4
18

Other
1.85
1.66
1.48
5

Totals
10
9
8
27

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 4.331666667

Our test statistic of 4.331666667 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s performance is not
dependent on its stated secondary objective.

Tertiary objectives were then tested against 7 programs with tertiary objectives.
Table 70: Program Performance by Tertiary Objective
Tertiary Objective
Program Performance Economic
Environmental
Other
High
0
0
1
Average
0
0
3
Low
2
0
1
Totals
2
0
5
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Totals
1
3
3
7

Expected frequencies were calculated for both variables
Table 71: Expected Frequencies for Table 70
Tertiary Objective
Program Performance
Economic
Environmental
High
0.28571428
0
Average
0.85714285
0
Low
0.85714285
0
Totals
2
0

Other
0.714285714
2.142857143
2.142857143
5

Totals
1
3
3
7

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 3.733333333
!
Our test statistic of 3.733333333 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s performance is not
dependent on its stated tertiary objective.

Test 3: Total Program Investment and Objective Order and Type
The third test was to determine whether or not the order and type of a program’s
articulated objective was dependent on a program’s level of investment.
Program investment was ranked as low, medium, and high based on the total
investment. Primary objectives were first tested against 54 programs that listed
a primary objective.
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Table 72: Level of Program Investment by Primary Objective
Primary Objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Other
Totals
Low
1
15
2
18
Medium
2
15
1
18
High
14
4
0
18
Totals
17
34
3
54
Expected frequencies were calculated for both tables:
Table 73: Expected Frequencies for Table 72
Primary objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Low
5.666666667
11.33333333
Medium
5.666666667
11.33333333
High
5.666666667
11.33333333
Totals
17
34

Other
1
1
1
3

Totals
18
18
18
54

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 30.58823529!

Our test statistic of 30.58 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell
frequencies in Table 72 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s level of
investment is dependent on its stated primary objective. Table 74 helps to make
this relationship more obvious.
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Table 74: Percentages for Table 72
Primary objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Other
Low
5.882352941
44.11764706
66.66666667
Medium
11.76470588
44.11764706
33.33333333
High
82.35294118
11.76470588
0
Totals
100
100
100

Totals
33.33333333
33.33333333
33.33333333
100

Approximately 82% of programs with a high level of investment articulate
economic primary objectives vs. 11% of programs with environmental primary
objectives. Conversely, programs with the lowest level of investment only state
an economic primary objective approximately 6% of the time, insinuating that
programs with economic primary objectives are more highly funded than those
with other primary objectives.

Secondary objectives were then tested against 21 programs with an articulated
secondary objective.

Table 75: Level of Program Investment by Secondary Objective
Secondary objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Other
Totals
Low
0
3
0
3
Medium
1
3
2
6
High
1
10
1
12
Totals
2
16
3
21
Expected frequencies were calculated for both tables:
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Table 76: Expected Frequencies for Table 75
Secondary objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Other
Low
0.285714286
2.285714286
0.428571429
Medium
0.571428571
4.571428571
0.857142857
High
1.142857143
9.142857143
1.714285714
Totals
2
16
3

Totals
3
6
12
21

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 3.71875
!
Our test statistic of 3.71875 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s level of investment is not
dependent on its stated secondary objective.
!
Tertiary objectives were then tested against 7 programs with tertiary objectives.
As only 7 programs had data for both level of investment and tertiary objective,
we can suspect from the outset that we will fail to reject our null hypothesis that
the two variables are independent.

132

Table 77: Level of Program Investment by Tertiary Objective
Tertiary Objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Other
Totals
Low
1
0
1
2
Medium
1
0
2
3
High
0
0
2
2
Totals
2
0
5
7
Expected frequencies were calculated for both tables:
Table 78: Expected Frequencies for Table 77
Tertiary Objective
Investment
Economic
Environmental
Other
Low
0.571428571
0
1.428571429
Medium
0.857142857
0
2.142857143
High
0.571428571
0
1.428571429
Totals
2
0
5

Totals
2
3
2
7

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 1.283333333!

Our test statistic of 1.283333333 falls out of the critical region and thus we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The observed
frequencies are not significantly different from the frequencies we would expect
to find if the variables were independent and only random chance were
operating. Based on the results, an AVR program’s level of investment is not
dependent on its stated tertiary objective.
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Test 4: Region and Primary Program Objective
The fourth test was to determine whether or not the primary articulated objective
of a particular program was dependent on the region in which a program was
conducted. Primary objectives were tested for 69 programs that listed a primary
objective.
Table 79: Region by Primary Objective
Primary Objective
Location
Economic
Environmental
European
15
8
North American
1
39
Other
2
0
Totals
18
47

Other
4
0
0
4

Totals
27
40
2
69

Expected frequencies were then calculated for both variables:
Table 80: Expected Frequencies for Table 79
Primary Objective
Location
Economic
Environmental
Other
European
7.043478261
18.39130435
1.565217391
North American
10.43478261
27.24637681
2.31884058
Other
0.52173913
1.362318841
0.115942029
Totals
18
47
4

Totals
27
40
2
69

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 45.6230792

Our test statistic of 45.63 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell
frequencies in Table 79 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The
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variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s stated primary
objective is dependent on its location. Table 81 helps to make this relationship
more obvious.
Table 81: Percentages for Table 79
Primary Objective
Location
Economic
Environmental
Other
European
83.33333333
17.0212766
100
North American
5.555555556
82.9787234
0
Other
11.11111111
0
0
Totals
100
100
100

Totals
39.13043478
57.97101449
2.898550725
100

Approximately 83% of European programs articulate economic primary
objectives vs. 17% of programs with environmental primary objectives.
Conversely, North American programs state environmental primary objectives
approximately 83% of the time vs. economic objectives stated as primary only
about 5% of the time. Programs outside of Europe and North America are
primarily concerned with economic objectives, while Europe houses the only
countries concerned primarily with other objectives.

Test 5: Level of Development and Primary Objective
The fifth test was to determine whether or not a program’s primary articulated
objective was dependent on a program’s level of development (population.)
Primary objectives were tested for 69 programs that listed a primary objective.
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Table 82: Level of Development by Primary Objective
Primary Objective
Population
Economic
Environmental
Other
Low
0
21
2
Medium
6
15
2
High
12
11
0
Totals
18
47
4

Totals
23
23
23
69

Expected frequencies were then calculated for both variables:
Table 83: Expected Frequencies for Table
Primary Objective
Population
Economic
Environmental
Low
6
15.66666667
Medium
6
15.66666667
High
6
15.66666667
Totals
18
47

82
Other
1.333333333
1.333333333
1.333333333
4

Totals
23
23
23
69

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 4
x2(critical) = 9.488
x2(obtained) = 17.23404255

Our test statistic of 17.23 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell
frequencies in Table 82 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s stated primary
objective is dependent on the level of development of the area in which it is
conducted. Table 79 helps to make this relationship more obvious.
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Table 84: Percentages for Table 82
Primary Objective
Population
Economic
Environmental
Low
0
44.68085106
Medium
33.33333333
31.91489362
High
66.66666667
23.40425532
Totals
100
100

Other
50
50
0
100

Totals
33.33333333
33.33333333
33.33333333
100

Approximately 66% of programs with a high level of development articulate
economic primary objectives vs. 33% of programs with a medium level of
development. Conversely, programs with a low level of development focus
primarily on environmental objectives. While areas with low and medium levels
of development seem concerned primarily with other objectives, the percentage
is misleading as only 4 programs fell into this group.

Test 6: Spatial Scale and Primary Objective
The sixth and final chi square test was to determine whether or not a program’s
primary articulated objective was dependent on a program’s spatial scale
(country, county, city). Primary objectives were tested for 69 programs that
listed a primary objective.
Table 85: Spatial Scale by Primary Objective
Primary Objective
Spatial Scale
Economic
Environmental
Nation
18
9
Region
0
14
State
0
12
County
0
5
City
0
7
Totals
18
47

Other
4
0
0
0
0
4

Expected frequencies were then calculated for both variables:
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Totals
31
14
12
5
7
69

Table 86: Expected Frequencies for Table 85
Primary Objective
Spatial Scale
Economic
Environmental
Other
Nation
8.086956522
21.11594203
1.797101449
Region
3.652173913
9.536231884
0.811594203
State
3.130434783
8.173913043
0.695652174
County
1.304347826
3.405797101
0.289855072
City
1.826086957
4.768115942
0.405797101
Totals
18
47
4

Totals
31
14
12
5
7
69

Sampling distribution = x2 distribution
Alpha = 0.05
Degrees of freedom = 10
x2(critical) = 18.307
x2(obtained) = 39.59094029!

Our test statistic of 39.59 falls into the critical region and thus we reject the null
hypothesis that the two variables are independent. The pattern of cell
frequencies in Table 85 is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. The
variables are dependent. Based on the data, an AVR program’s stated primary
objective is dependent on the spatial scale in which it is conducted. Table 82
helps to make this relationship more obvious.
Table 87: Percentages for Table 85
Primary Objective
Spatial Scale
Economic
Environmental
Nation
100
19.14893617
Region
0
29.78723404
State
0
25.53191489
County
0
10.63829787
City
0
14.89361702
Totals
100
100
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Other
100
0
0
0
0
100

Totals
44.92753623
20.28985507
17.39130435
7.246376812
10.14492754
100

For this test we can see that only nations are apt to have economic and other
primary objectives. The remaining five spatial scales only have primary
environmental objectives. Regional scales account for 29% of those programs
with primary environmental objectives, while less than 20% of national programs
have a primary objective classified as “environmental.”

Descriptive Statistics
Thirty-Eight programs with primary environmental objectives and 18 programs
with primary economic objectives were looked at as part of this analysis. Each
program varied in size and outcome. Simply, by observing the range for both
programs we can see that programs with an economic primary objective are
much larger than those with environmental primary objectives. Correspondingly,
the standard deviation for programs with an economic primary objective is
nearly three times that of programs with an environmental primary objective,
even though there were approximately twice as many programs with an
environmental primary objective.

Table 88: Descriptive Table for Primary Objectives
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Range

Economic Primary
Objective
377,602.56
215,000
472,258.01
1,982,728.00
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Environmental Primary
Objective
55,875.42
7,683.50
165,361.2123
749,938.00

Summary
Chi square tests were utilized to assess objectives for statistical significance
against a host of variables including: type of objective by order of objective;
program performance by primary, secondary, and tertiary objective; level of
investment by primary, secondary, and tertiary objective; program region by
primary objective; level of development (population) by primary objective; and
spatial scale (nation, state, region, county, city) by primary objective. The tests
confirmed whether or not the null hypothesis, that the variables are independent
in the population, was true. In instances when the null hypothesis was rejected,
we can conclude that the variables are dependent on one another. Calculated
percentages allow us to see how independent variables affect dependent
variables. Looking at program means and standard deviations, we can see
clearly that programs with an economic focus were much larger than programs
with an environmental focus. From our tests we learned that:
•

The order of an objective is dependent on the type of objective.

•

Program performance is dependent on the type of primary objective, but
not the type of secondary or tertiary objective.

•

The level of investment in a program is dependent on the type of primary
objective, but not the type of secondary or tertiary objective.

•

The type of primary objective articulated by a program is dependent on
the region in which an AVR program is held.

•

The type of primary objective articulated by a program is dependent on
the level of development (population) where a program is held, and

•

the type of primary objective articulated by a program is dependent on
the scale (nation, region, state, county, city) where a program is held.
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Importance of Stakeholders
Though dependencies among objectives to various program variables have
been uncovered in our analysis, it is important to note the importance of
stakeholders and the role they might play in establishing program objectives.
While it may now be obvious that program performance is dependent on the
type of primary objective articulated by a program, it may not be obvious that a
number of forces might influence the type of primary objective. As shown by the
most recent wave of AVR programs aimed at generating economic stimulation, a
host of political stakeholders may have a say in the type of objective articulated
by a program. In the last wave of programs (2009-2010) we can assume that
labor unions, automobile manufacturers, and political parties each had a hand
in ensuring a program was aimed at an economic objective rather than an
environmental. Additionally, we can assume that environmentalists and air
quality management districts faced with poor air quality throughout California,
had a hand in influencing a majority of California programs would be focused on
the environment.

Descriptive statistics show us that economic programs are much larger in scale
and performance than environmental programs, a phenomenon that may deal
with the speed in which a program’s reward is realized. The impact of a
program aimed at stimulating the economy will be felt much sooner than that of
a program focused on the environment. Environmental programs strive to realize
results immediately, but also far in the future. Economic programs may have a
more immediate effect on an economy. This short-term vs. long-term
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perspective comes back to how willing stakeholders are to wait to see the
objectives of an AVR program, designed under their reign, met.

Ecological Impact
Proponents and opponents alike cite the ecological impact of an AVR program
as cause for conducting such a program. While the extent to which an AVR
program harms or helps the environment could potentially, by itself, dictate how
future programs are directed, available data on environmental impacts is scant.
Nine programs provided data for both tons of emissions reduced and the
number of vehicles retired. Another ten programs provided data for tons of
emissions reduced, but not the number of vehicles retired. Based on the limited
amount of records concerning AVR environmental aspects, the data was
analyzed to determine the strength of relationship between ecological impacts
and other variables.

As each factor can be measured at the interval-ratio level, statistical techniques
were employed to determine correlations between between the total emissions
(tons) and other program variables. By means of calculating Pearson’s r, the
coefficient of determination (r2,) and the slope between different variables, the
analysis sought to answer three questions: Is there a relationship between the
variables? How strong is the relationship? What is the direction of the
relationship?

Because data available on factors affecting program performance is based on
data from a random sample from all AVR programs, it is necessary to test our
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calculated r values for significance. For all inspections we assume: random
sampling, an interval-ratio level of measurement, bivariate normal distributions, a
linear relationship, homoscedasticity, and that our sampling distribution is
normal. Our null hypothesis is that there is no linear association between the two
variables in the population from which the sample was drawn. Our sampling
distribution is a t distribution, with an Alpha of 0.05. After measures of
association were calculated, each measure was then tested for significance.

Caveats and Summary
Calculations concerning correlations between different program variables and
the ecological impact of a program were first conducted using all available data
related to the total emissions (tons) reduced by a program. This was later
amended because it was noted that a negative correlation existed between the
minimum vehicle age requirement set by a program and the total emissions
reduction. Intuitively we know that older cars generate the most emissions, and
that raising the minimum age would thus realize a greater emissions reduction.
Inspecting the numbers we realized that the number reported by the 2009 U.S.
CARS program (336,608) was inordinately proportioned to all other program
numbers. The U.S. CARS program represented an outlier in the data, and in an
attempt to normalize our calculations the program was deleted. Table 89 details
available emissions (tons) reductions by program:
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Table 89: Program Emissions (tons) Reductions

Program
Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program
High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS)
Illinois EPA
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP II)
Old Car buyback program (2006-2010)
REMOVE Program Phase VI
REMOVE Program Phase VIII
Total Clean Cars Program
Consumer Assistance Program (2001)
REMOVE Program Phase VII
REMOVE Program Phase IV
Vehicle Buy-Back Program (1995- 1996)
REMOVE Program Phase V
REMOVE Program Phase I
REMOVE Program Phase II
Vehicle Buy-Back Program (1997 - 1998)
REMOVE Program Phase III
Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP)
United States

Emissions (tons)
Reduction
16
28.1
51
64
66
104
156
245.6
274.5
304
325
325
360
400
525
525
590
6400
336608

Once the 2009 U.S. CARS program was removed, our issue with the minimum
vehicle age was rectified. However, other correlations appear to have also
shifted dramatically. For this reason calculations with and without the U.S.
program have been included in this analysis:
Table 90: Correlation Summary - Factors Affecting Program Environmental
Performance (2009 U.S. CARS program included)

!"#""

"#!

Total
Program
Investment

Total Emissions
.99
Reduction r value
Statistical Significance
to Total AVR
!
Population
(See Appendix A for included Programs)

Number of
Vehicles
Retired

""!

"$!

"#!

Maximum
Incentive

Program
Duration

Minimum Vehicle
Age
Requirement

.49

.97

-0.23

-0.49

!

!

"

!
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"#!

Table 91: Correlation Summary - Factors Affecting Program Environmental
Performance (2009 U.S. CARS program excluded)

!"#""

"%!

Total
Program
Investment

Total Emissions
.009
Reduction r value
Statistical Significance
to Total AVR
"
Population
(See Appendix A for included Programs)

Number of
Vehicles
Retired

"&!

"'!

"%!

Maximum
Incentive

Program
Duration

Minimum Vehicle
Age
Requirement

"%!

.13

-.05

-.27

.21

!

!

"

!

One might note the drastic differences in tables 90 and 91. The 2009 U.S. CARS
program, with an investment of 3.2 billion out performs the next highest invested
program in our group by 3,162,000,000. As well the program retired nearly
640,000 more vehicles than the next comparable program in the group.

It would not be prudent to speculate about whether or not the U.S. CARS
program is flawed. However, one can confidently state that it is drastically larger
than other programs, and that though the programs are much smaller the
number reported by the U.S. CARS program does not seem relative in
comparison. Data about how emissions (tons) reduction numbers were tested
and reported is not available. Transparency about how numbers are reported
may solve this debate.

We should also address the sheer lack of reporting on total emissions (tons)
reductions across all programs. While many of the statutes found do require that
a program report its emissions reduction data, the requirement has not been
enforced. Not only is the reporting requirement not enforced, but also many of
the programs that did report numbers in inconsistent manners. The most
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appropriate direction for further ecological study of AVR programs is to ensure
consistency in how emissions (tons) reduction numbers are reported.

Finally, we must acknowledge that emissions (tons) reduction numbers are but
one way environmental aspects of an AVR program might be tested. If accurate
vehicle lifecycle cost analysis and/or smogcheck data over the lifetime of a
vehicle were available, the numbers would perhaps present a more accurate
way to calculate the environmental impact of removing vehicles from the road. In
the past the price of a ton of carbon has been used to articulate how a program
performs monetarily. The cost of carbon was not used in our analysis, as the
number is almost always in flux. In summary, a host of environmental indicators
exist with which to judge the performance of AVR programs, however their
availability may complicate an analysis.

The capacity to judge AVR program performance based on environmental
indicators is problematic. Environmental indicators of program performance
have not been recorded by a number of programs, due to the difficulty of
obtaining such information and separate program objectives. By way of
analyzing programs that did record such information, assumptions can be made
about how various program factors affect environmental performance.
!
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Findings
Accelerated Vehicle Retirement programs identified for this analysis vary in
scale and articulated objective. Program distinctions are significant and
beneficial for understanding how and why given programs result in different
levels of effectiveness. Though programs articulate a number of “primary”
objectives, to that end a program will be most effective when it retires a
maximum number of vehicles. Comparing factors affecting program
performance across 75 programs can offer insight into how future AVR
programs might be most effective.

Through content and statistical analysis, we were able to extrapolate
correlations among data from past programs and factors affecting program
performance. Each of the factors: total monetary investment, minimum and
maximum incentive amount offered to participants, program duration, and the
minimum vehicle age required to participate affect program performance. It is
essential to remain aware that the five factors are not wholly responsible for how
a program performs, and that other factors such as current economic cycle,
existing auto ownership, culture, and availability of information on a program
may also play a role in a program’s performance.

Additionally, statistical analysis exposed how dependencies among articulated
program objectives and certain program attributes: performance, investment,
population, location and spatial scale. Analyzing dependencies and factors
affecting program performance provides a basis to develop a framework for
future AVR programs.
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Factors Affecting Program Performance
Five factors were identified that affect program performance:
•

Total Monetary Investment

•

Minimum Participant Incentive Amount

•

Maximum Participant Incentive Amount

•

Program Duration, and

•

Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement.

As AVR programs are implemented in the future, planners and government
officials alike should note the relationships uncovered in this analysis in order to
design the most effective program for their particular area. Litanies of
relationships were exposed through our analysis. However, the ways in which
each factor positively or negatively affects one another, and total program
performance, can be summarized by the following:
1. An increase in the total monetary investment in a program will increase
the number of vehicles retired, minimum participant incentive, and
maximum participant incentive.
2. An increase in the minimum participant incentive for a program will
increase the total number of vehicles retired, total monetary investment in
a program, and maximum participant incentive.
3. An increase in the maximum participant incentive for a program will
increase the total number of vehicles retired, total monetary investment in
a program, and the minimum participant incentive.
4. An increase in program duration will decrease the total number of
vehicles retired, the total monetary investment in a program, both the
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minimum and maximum participant incentives for a program, and the
minimum vehicle age requirement to participate in a program.
5. An increase in the minimum vehicle age requirement for a program will
decrease the number of vehicles retired, the total monetary investment in
a program, both the minimum and maximum incentive amounts offered
by a program, and a program’s duration.

Impact of Objectives
The objectives a program stipulates can shape a program’s performance.
Program objectives were classified by order and type. The order of articulated
objectives were categorized as: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Objective
types were categorized as: economic, environmental, and “other.” Objectives
categorized as “other” include road safety, reduction of the minimum vehicle
age, and the elimination of two-stroke engines (Hungary.) The degree to which
articulated objectives are dependent on program variables can be summarized
by the following:
1. The order of objectives articulated by an AVR program is dependent on
the type of objective. An AVR program’s primary objective is 42% more
likely to be an environmental objective than an economic objective.
Economic objectives are 17% more likely to be a program’s primary
objective, rather than a secondary objective. A program’s tertiary
objective is likely to be an objective other than economic or
environmental 45% of the time.
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2. A program’s level of performance is dependent on type of primary
objective. High performing programs stipulate primary economic
objectives 66% of the time.
3. A program’s level of performance is not dependent on its articulated
secondary or tertiary objective.
4. The level of investment in a program is dependent on a program’s
primary objective. Eighty-two percent of programs with a high level of
investment articulate primary economic objectives.
5. The level of investment in a program is not dependent on articulated
secondary or tertiary objectives.
6. The type of objective articulated by a program is dependent on where a
program

is

conducted.

European

programs

articulate

economic

objectives 83% of the time, while North American programs stipulate
environmental objectives 82% of the time.
7. The type of objective stipulated by a program is dependent on the level
of development in an area where an AVR program is conducted. Areas
with high populations stipulate economic objectives 66% of the time,
while areas with low populations stipulate economic objectives only 44%
of the time.
8. The type of objective stipulated by an AVR program is dependent on the
governmental scale that conducts the program. Programs conducted at
the national scale stipulate economic objectives 100% of the time, while
programs

conducted

at

the

regional

and

state

environmental objectives 29% and 25% respectively.
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level

stipulate

9. The average number of vehicles retired is much larger (377,602.54) for
programs with economic primary objectives than programs with
environmental primary objectives (55,875.42).

Ecological Impact
How factors affecting program performance dictate how positively or negatively
a program impacts the environment is a chief concern for planners that might
design future programs. Five factors were tested against a ecological impact,
including:
•

Number of Vehicles Retired

•

Total Monetary Investment

•

Maximum Participant Incentive

•

Program Duration, and

•

Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement

Though past programs have not focused exclusively on how well they benefit
or hurt the environment, an AVR program’s ability to affect total emission
(tons) output in a given area is important for future programs. As knowledge
and interest in global warming and how it is impacted by mobile emissions
sources continues to rise, planners and policymakers may use AVR
programs as a weapon to combat atmospheric deterioration. How factors
affecting program performance effect the environment can be summarized
by the following:
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1. An increase in the number of vehicles retired will increase the total
emissions (tons) reduction.
2. An increase in the total monetary investment in a program will
increase the total emissions (tons) reduction.
3. An increase in the maximum participant incentive offered by a
program will increase the total emissions (tons) reduction.
4. An increase in a program’s duration will decrease the total emissions
(tons) reduction.
5. An increase in the minimum vehicle age requirement for a program
will most likely increase the total emissions (tons) reduction.

Summary
Our analysis concludes that larger monetary investments (total program
investment, minimum participant incentive, and maximum participant incentive)
ensure greater program performance in terms of the number of vehicles retired
and ecological impact. The benefit of an AVR program is commensurate with
the cost of a program. Program performance is sensitive to the participant
incentive amount offered, and is highest for those programs that offer higher
incentives. Programs with longer durations and higher minimum vehicle age
requirements will encounter diminished program performance.

Objectives stipulated for AVR programs can motivate different levels of program
performance. The highest performing programs are those that articulate primary
economic objectives, and are also those programs with the greatest level of
investment. As programs with higher levels of investment retire more vehicles,

152

our analysis of objectives is in line with our analysis of factors affecting program
performance. Programs that primarily focus on stimulating vehicle sales
(economic objective) retire more vehicles than those with an environmental
focus.
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Framework Design
In order to formulate a framework for future implementation of AVR schemes it is
necessary to combine conclusions arrived at through analysis of past AVR
programs. The framework provides guidance for structuring an AVR program,
and for evaluating a program based on objective. AVR programs can be
conducted at various spatial and governmental scales. No two AVR programs
are exactly the same, and certain program variables will vary according to the
size of the area in which an AVR program is conducted. Because no two AVR
programs are the same, developing an all-encompassing framework for
implementation could take several forms.

One way to limit the number of forms a framework for AVR implementation might
take is to utilize existing plan structures. The Government Performance Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA,) detailed on page 69 is the most obvious and accessible
template in which to base a framework for AVR implementation around. GPRA
requires that federal government agencies formulate goals and performance
monitoring plans for all proposed programs (Heen 2000 1). Under GPRA,
agencies must also measure and report program outcomes (Heen 2000 1).
Employing the GPRA template, a strategic and performance plan were created
first for programs with an economic objective and secondly for programs with an
environmental objective, based on findings throughout our analysis. Tables 92 95 detail the four plans.
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Table 92: Strategic Plan Framework for Economically Focused AVR Programs

Introduce AVR as a pathway to
attaining a new, reliable alternative to
“clunkers”

Leverage an AVR program to
increase value, strength, and overall
competitiveness of automobile
industry

Goals

!

Objectives

Build coalitions
between
policymakers and
auto industry
stakeholders.
Develop an
integrated, clear
way to disseminate
program
information.

Identify new vehicle
models that align
with stipulated AVR
program goals.
Construct
competitive
incentive scheme to
entice customers to
participate in
program

How to Achieve

External Factors

Stipulate economic
stipulation as primary
program goal
Research past AVR
programs to show viability
of such programs as
economic motivators.

Economic downswings
Lack of vehicle data
Ability to reach all wouldbe participants

Identify inexpensive
vehicle options available to
program participants
Distinguish incentive
amounts adequate to lure
maximum participation
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Number of vehicles
retired
Number of new vehicles
purchased
Number of dealership
contacts.

Embark on intense,
concise public relations
campaign

Converse with automobile
manufactures about
increasing the availability
of approved vehicle
models.

Evaluation

Lack of control over
vehicle production
Deficiency of inexpensive
vehicle models that also
meet set program criteria
Shortage of funds
available

Identification of substitute
vehicle models
Program participation

Table 93: Strategic Plan Framework for Environmentally Focused AVR Programs

Introduce inexpensive new vehicles
as an environmentally friendly
alternative to driving a "clunker."

Stimulate mobile source emissions
reductions through the initiation of an
AVR program

Goals

Objectives

Create models
illustrating the effects
of driving an older
vehicle vs. a new
vehicle in terms of
emissions output
Identify public
misinformation about
CO2 emissions prior
to program initiation.

Identify low-impact
new vehicle models,
and their price points,
to participants
throughout program
duration.
Survey would be
participants about
effective program
incentives.

How to Achieve

External Factors

Evaluation

Stipulate vehicle emissions
reduction as primary
program goal
Research current in-use
vehicle models and
develop diagrams that
show emissions output vs.
new vehicle options

Public neglect of
environmental concern

Number of vehicles retired

Lack of vehicle data

Number of new vehicles
purchased

Amount of participation

Total emissions reduction

Survey general public
about perception of CO2
emissions 3 months prior to
program

Converse with automobile
manufactures about most
environmentally friendly
vehicle options.
Identify inexpensive vehicle
options available to
program participants
Distinguish incentive
amounts adequate to lure
maximum participation
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Lack of environmentally
friendly vehicle models
Deficiency of inexpensive
vehicle models

Identification of substitute
vehicle models
Program participation

Shortage of funds
available

Table 94: Performance Plan Framework for Economically Focused AVR Program

Retire 100,000 Vehicles to stimulate automotive Industry

Goal

Operational
Processes

Establish Economic Stimulation as
Primary Program Goal
Greater Investment = Greater Program
Performance
Greater Incentive Amounts = Greater
Program Performance
Shorter Program Duration = Greater
Program Performance
Reduced Minimum Vehicle Age
Requirement = Greater Program
Performance

Performance
Indicator

Benchmark and
basis
for Comparison

Means to Validate
Measured Values

Above Average
Program
Participation
.000257 increase in
vehicles retired per
dollar invested.
124.32 increase in
the number of
vehicles retired per
dollar added to
minimum incentive
88.02 increase in the
number of vehicles
retired per dollar
added to maximum
incentive.
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100,000 participants
Total Investment =
389,686,103.70
Minimum Inventive
Amount = 804.31
Maximum Incentive
Amount = 1135.98

Statistical Analysis
found in Accelerated
Vehicle Retirement:
Toward a
Conceptualized
Framework for
Design and
Implementation

Table 95: Performance Plan Framework for Environmentally Focused Program

Retire 100,000 Vehicles to reduce total emissions (tons)

Goal

Operational
Processes

Performance
Indicator

Benchmark and basis
for Comparison

Means to Validate
Measured Values

Establish Total Emissions (tons)
reduction as Primary Program
Goal
Greatest Number of Vehicles
Retired = Greatest Emissions
(tons) reduction

Above Average Program
Participation

Greater Investment = Greater
Emissions (tons) reduction

.49790 increase in
emissions reduction per
vehicle retired

Greater Incentive Amounts =
Greater Emissions (tons)
reduction

.000105 increase in
emissions reduction per
dollar invested.

Shorter Program Duration =
Greater Emissions (tons)
reduction

84.68 increase in in
emissions reduction per
dollar added to maximum
incentive.

100,000 participants
Total Emissions
Reduction 49,790.88

Statistical Analysis found
in Accelerated Vehicle
Retirement: Toward a
Conceptualized
Framework for Design
and Implementation

Reduced Minimum Vehicle Age
Requirement = Greater
Emissions (tons) reduction

Implementation of an AVR framework based on the GPRA template and recommendations from this analysis can
help to shape future AVR programs so that they attain both program objectives and maximum performance.
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Opportunities exist at all levels of planning for planners to formulate ways to
cope with increasingly automobile – dependent populations. While long-term
approaches such as mass-transit and congestion pricing should be scrutinized,
short-term approaches must also be considered. Accelerated Vehicle
Retirement offers a blunt instrument with which planners can affect rapid
change. Because AVR programs typically require a sizeable initial investment,
local level planning agencies have shied away from such programs. However,
with proper program design and well-articulated objectives, AVR programs can
be designed to affect economic and ecological change at a variety of
governmental levels.

Planning agencies house the research tools necessary to design AVR programs
to fit their particular areas. A large pool of past programs can be scrutinized to
determine how to best design an AVR program. Many local Air Quality
Management Districts can provide a wealth of information about how AVR
programs can work at a more local level. Implementing AVR programs at the
local level can provide planners opportunities to meet stringent air quality
attainment level set by the Clean Air Acts and generate an economic upsurge.
The roles planners play in attaining air quality standards and economic
development are important to communities of all sizes. Planners possess the
means necessary to ensure AVR programs are designed well.

!
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Contributions
This project contributes to the literature on AVR by providing a clearinghouse of
data focused on AVR programs to date. By means of exposing relationships
between various factors affecting program performance and program
objectives, the project articulates the structure of how future programs might be
designed. The project contributes to the professional field of planning by
revealing actions planners can take to ensure future AVR programs are
designed in such a way that articulated program goals are met. The analysis of
factors affecting AVR performance will be useful to policymakers as they
endeavor to regulate our current automobile-dependent society.

Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research
The research presented in this thesis is fluid, and will alter as AVR programs
continue to be implemented. Like the surge of AVR programs that took place,
more programs will likely take place as the world struggles to cope with a “new
economy.” This project only considered factors affecting program performance
and the objectives articulated by AVR programs; it did not consider the
relationship of program performance to the total number of vehicles registered
in a particular area, the true impact of automobile manufacturers on program
performance, regional specific emissions standards for vehicles, or true political
motivation behind program implementation. Because of time and financial
constraints the framework designed in this analysis was not tested. In the future
it will be important to not how the recommendations provided in this analysis
transform as future AVR programs are completed. Throughout the analysis,
language, currency, and familiarity with automobiles in foreign nations
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presented barriers. Data mining often resulted in conflicting approximations,
only to be confirmed much later. As well, the analysis most likely suffers from an
American view of vehicle miles traveled, economic status, and environmental
concern. Appealing avenues for future research include looking at AVR from a
non-American perspective, juxtaposing the cost of AVR implementation to
current conjectures of carbon pricing, and design of a more in-depth framework.
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Summary
It can be inferred from our analysis that while great numbers of AVR programs
have taken place in the past, a consistent framework for design and
implementation has not been present. Had key relationships among program
variables been published, a more consistent sample of AVR implementation
would be available. Still, because of lack of recorded data for aspects in several
programs, our assumptions cannot be generalized to all past AVR programs.

The relationships uncovered in this analysis provide a framework with which
planners can develop future AVR programs as a means of attaining a specified
program goal. As the data contained in this project has not been collectively
assembled till now, the project exists as a fountain for future researchers to drink
from and as a guide for entities considering AVR implementation. AVR program
performance is dependent on the type of objective set forth by a program’s
managing agency. Programs are correlated with a host of variables affecting
program performance. Planners and policymakers alike must develop systems
to cope with the peripheral consequences of an auto-dependent society. One
solution to ills resultant of a society depending on automobile travel is AVR. This
analysis has provided an investigation of past AVR programs, and a framework
within which planners can most effectively implement AVR programs in the
future.
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Appendix A. Table Citations and Excluded Programs
Table 6
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Adda and Cooper, 2001; Arcemont, Gary, 2011;
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Autoplus.fr, 2010; Baltas & Xepapadeas,
1999; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay Area Air Quality
Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; BIS, 2010; British Columbia ScrapIt, 2010; California Air Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality
Management District, 2009; California Board of Auto Repair, 2009;
Canadiandriver.com, 2009; Cayting, 2011; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail,
2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de Alina, 2009; Dill, 2001; Dutch Daily News,
2009; ECMT, 1999; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; Hahn, 1995; IHS
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Jacobs, 1990; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; PR Newswire 1993; Retire
Your Ride, 2011; Romania-Insider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; San Joaquin Valley
Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution
Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District,
2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara
County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat, 2010; Smathers, 2011; Teskey,
2010a; Sokol & Harmacy; Teskey, 2010b; Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality, 2011; Transport Canada, 2010; University of California, Los Angeles,
1999; Williams, J., 2010
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Table 16
Central Intelligence Agency, 2011
Table 17
California Department of Finance; Southern California Association of
Governments, 2000; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011.
Table 18
U.S. Census Bureau, 2011
Table 19
Calgary Economic Development, 2011; Central Intelligence Agency, 2011;
Ministry of Citizens' Services Government of British Columbia, 2011
Table 20
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Central Intelligence Agency, 2011;
Dill, 2001; ECMT, 1999
Table 21
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com,
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; RomaniaInsider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;
Table 22
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air
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Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009;
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b;
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat,
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010
Table 23
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001;
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011
Table 24
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010
Table 25
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill,
2001; ECMT, 1999
Table 26
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com,
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; RomaniaInsider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;
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Table 27
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009;
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b;
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat,
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010
Table 28
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001;
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011
Table 29
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010
Table 30
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill,
2001; ECMT, 1999
Table 31
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com,
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
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Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; RomaniaInsider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;
Table 32
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009;
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b;
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat,
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010
Table 33
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001;
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011
Table 34
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010
Table 35
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill,
2001; ECMT, 1999
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Table 36
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com,
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; RomaniaInsider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;
Table 37
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009;
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b;
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat,
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010
Table 38
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001;
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011
Table 39
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010
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Table 40
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill,
2001; ECMT, 1999
Table 41:
Number of Vehicles Retired
Excluded Programs – Total Monetary Investment: Greece, Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program 1, Consumer Assistance
Program 3, REMOVE Program Phase I – IV, Delaware Vehicle Retirement
Program, Illinois EPA, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It
Pilot Program, Scrap-It, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark,
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy

Included Programs – Minimum Participant Incentive: Cyprus 1, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, United
States, Old Car buyback program, Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High
Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It,
France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina

Excluded Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: REMOVE Program Phases
I
REMOVE Program Phase II-VIII, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy
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Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP II-IV), REMOVE Program Phases I – VIII, Denmark, France,
Italy

Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Consumer Assistance Program
California Consumer Assistance Program (all years), REMOVE Program Phase IVIII, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), France, Hungary, Italy, Italy
Table 42
Number of Vehicles Retired
Excluded Programs – Total Monetary Investment: Greece, Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program 1, Consumer Assistance
Program 3, REMOVE Program Phase I – IV, Delaware Vehicle Retirement
Program, Illinois EPA, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It
Pilot Program, Scrap-It, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark,
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy

Included Programs – Minimum Participant Incentive: Cyprus 1, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, United
States, Old Car buyback program, Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High
Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It,
France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina

Excluded Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: REMOVE Program Phase
I-VIII, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy
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Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP II-IV), REMOVE Program Phases I – VIII, Denmark, France,
Italy

Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Consumer Assistance Program
California Consumer Assistance Program (all years), REMOVE Program Phase IVIII, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), France, Hungary, Italy, Italy

Table 43
Total Monetary Investment
Included Programs - Minimum Incentive: Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, Old
Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I, REMOVE Program Phase II,
REMOVE Program Phase III, REMOVE Program Phase IV, REMOVE Program
Phase V, REMOVE Program Phase VI, REMOVE Program Phase VII, REMOVE
Program Phase VIII, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement
Pilot Program, Argentina

Excluded Programs – Maximum Incentive: Greece, Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark,
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy
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Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV),
Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark,
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy, Old
Car buyback program

Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Greece, Unocal
South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled
Auto Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance
Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program,
Consumer Assistance Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), Delaware
Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It,
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, France, France, France,
Greece, Hungary, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy

Table 44
Total Monetary Investment
Included Programs - Minimum Incentive: Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States, Old
Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I, REMOVE Program Phase II,
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REMOVE Program Phase III, REMOVE Program Phase IV, REMOVE Program
Phase V, REMOVE Program Phase VI, REMOVE Program Phase VII, REMOVE
Program Phase VIII, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement
Pilot Program, Argentina

Excluded Programs – Maximum Incentive: Greece, Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark,
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy

Excluded Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP IV),
Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance
Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It Program, Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark,
France, France, France, Greece, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy, Old
Car buyback program

Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Greece, Unocal
South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP III), Unocal South Coast Recycled
Auto Program (SCRAP IV), Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer
Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance
Program, Consumer Assistance Program, Consumer Assistance Program,
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Consumer Assistance Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS), Delaware
Vehicle Retirement Program, Illinois EPA, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It,
Alberta Clean Air Scrappage Pilot Project, Denmark, France, France, France,
Greece, Hungary, Spain, Spain, Ireland, Norway, Italy, Italy
Table 45
Minimum Incentive Amount
Included Programs – Maximum Incentive Amount: Cyprus, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain,
United States, Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII,
Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot
Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy,
Argentina

Included Programs – Program Duration: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States,
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina

Included Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States,
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Argentina

175

Table 46
Minimum Incentive Amount
Included Programs – Maximum Incentive Amount: Cyprus, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain,
United States, Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII,
Illinois EPA, Drive a Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot
Program, Scrap-It Pilot Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy,
Argentina

Included Programs – Program Duration: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States,
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Italy, Italy, Argentina

Included Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovakia, Spain, United States,
Old Car buyback program, REMOVE Program Phase I- VIII, Illinois EPA, Drive a
Clean Machine, High Pollution Vehicle Retirement Pilot Program, Scrap-It Pilot
Program, Scrap-It, France, Spain, Spain, Argentina
Table 47
Maximum Incentive Amount
Excluded Programs – Program Duration: UNOCAL SCRAP II-IV, France and
Greece (Group 5)
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Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: California Consumer
Assistance Programs 1-7, HEROS, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Italy
Table 48
Maximum Incentive Amount
Excluded Programs – Program Duration: UNOCAL SCRAP II-IV, France and
Greece (Group 5)

Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: California Consumer
Assistance Programs 1-7, HEROS, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Italy
Table 49
Program Duration
Excluded Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: UNOCAL SCRAP IIIV, California Consumer Assistance Programs 1-7, Denmark, France, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Italy
Table 50
Excluded Programs - Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: UNOCAL SCRAP IIIV, California Consumer Assistance Programs 1-7, Denmark, France, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Italy
Table 52
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com,
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS
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Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; RomaniaInsider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;
2010b;
Table 53
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009;
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b;
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat,
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010
Table 54
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001;
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011
Table 55
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010
Table 56
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill,
2001; ECMT, 1999
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Table 57
ACEA, 2009; ACEA, 2010; Autoplus.fr, 2010; BIS, 2010; Canadiandriver.com,
2009; Cyprus Blog, 2009; Cyprus Mail, 2010; Cyprus-Forum.com, 2010; de
Alina, 2009; Dutch Daily News, 2009; GAO, 2010; Global Trade Alert, 2010; IHS
Global Insight, 2010; International Energy Agency, 2010; International Monetary
Fund, 2010; Joshi, 2010; OECD, 2010; Retire Your Ride, 2011; RomaniaInsider.com, 2010; Root, 2010; Teskey, 2010a; Teskey, 2010b;
Table 58
Arcemont, Gary, 2011; Bay Area Air Quality Management District, 2010; Bay
Area Air Quality Management District, 2010b; Bearden, 1996; California Air
Resources Board, 2005; California Air Quality Management District, 2009;
California Board of Auto Repair, 2009; Dill, 2001; Hahn, 1995; Jacobs, 1990; PR
Newswire 1993; San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District, 2007; San
Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2000; San Joaquin Valley
Unified Air Pollution Control District, 2005; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution
Control District, 2006; Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006b;
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District, 2006c; Santa Barbara Edhat,
2010; University of California, Los Angeles, 1999; Williams, J., 2010
Table 59
Alberini et al., 1995; Allan et al., 2009; Bearden, 1996; Cayting, 2011; Dill, 2001;
Hahn, 1995; Smathers, 2011; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 2011
Table 60
British Columbia Scrap-It, 2010; Sokol & Harmacy; Transport Canada, 2010
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Table 61
Adda and Cooper, 2001; Allan et al., 2009; Baltas & Xepapadeas, 1999; Dill,
2001; ECMT, 1999
Table 90
Ecological Impact
Included Programs – Number of Vehicles Retired: Unocal South Coast Recycled
Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP
II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle BuyBack Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS),
Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program, Illinois EPA,
United States

Included Programs – Total Monetary Investment
Included Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle
Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I
(HEROS), Total Clean Cars Program, United States, REMOVE Program Phase IVIII

Included Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program,
Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I
(HEROS), Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program,
Illinois EPA, United States, REMOVE Program Phase I - VIII
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Include Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle BuyBack Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars
Program, Illinois EPA, United States, REMOVE Program Phase I-VIII
Table 91
Ecological Impact
Included Programs – Number of Vehicles Retired: Unocal South Coast Recycled
Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP
II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle BuyBack Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I (HEROS),
Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program, Illinois EPA

Included Programs – Total Monetary Investment
Included Programs – Maximum Participant Incentive: Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program, Vehicle
Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I
(HEROS), Total Clean Cars Program, REMOVE Program Phase I-VIII

Included Programs – Program Duration: Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto
Program (SCRAP), Old Car buyback program, Consumer Assistance Program,
Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, High Emitter or Scrap I
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(HEROS), Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars Program,
Illinois EPA, REMOVE Program Phase I - VIII

Include Programs – Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement: Unocal South Coast
Recycled Auto Program (SCRAP), Unocal South Coast Recycled Auto Program
(SCRAP II), Old Car buyback program, Vehicle Buy-Back Program, Vehicle BuyBack Program, Delaware Vehicle Retirement Program, Total Clean Cars
Program, Illinois EPA, REMOVE Program Phase I-VIII

!
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Appendix B. Subgroup Analysis
Number of Vehicles Retired
How are the number of vehicles retired in a program affected by that program’s
total monetary investment, offered individual incentive, length of duration, and
minimum vehicle age requirement?
Investment
Insufficient data resulted in an inability to calculate correlations between the
total amount invested in a program and the total number of vehicles retired for
Groups 4 and 5. Table 94 details correlations for individual programs and total
program investment.

Table 96: Correlation Table: Total Investment and Number of
Vehicles Retired
Group
Group 1: Worldwide
Programs (2009 - 2010)
Group 2: California
Programs (1990 - 2010)
Group 3: U.S. State-Based
Programs (1992 - 2010)
All Groups

Correlation
Coefficient

Coefficient of
Determination

%

Slope

0.92420853

0.85416140

85%

0.000247302

0.88738871

0.78745873

78%

0.000625629

0.99999741

0.99999483

99%

0.000311097

0.77415292

0.59931275

59%

0.000256617

Minimum Incentive
When only one incentive amount was known, that data was categorized to be
the maximum incentive amount. Therefore, the minimum incentive amount was
known for very few programs. Insufficient data resulted in an inability to
calculate correlations between a program’s minimum incentive and the total
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number of vehicles retired for Groups 2 and 4. Table 95 details correlations for
all programs
Table 97: Correlation Table: Minimum Incentive and Number of
Vehicles Retired
Group
Group 1: Worldwide
Programs (2009 - 2010)
Group 3: U.S. State-Based
Programs (1992 - 2010)
Group 5: Worldwide
Programs (1992 - 2000)
All Groups

Correlation
Coefficient

Coefficient of
Determination

%

Slope

0.67915941

0.46125750

46%

232.624658

0.98985433

0.97981160

98%

18.70691739

0.66402903

0.44093455

44%

1663.395474

0.30089911

0.090540273

9%

124.3298422

Maximum Incentive
The maximum incentive amount offered to program participants was located for
all programs except the 1991 – 1993 Greek program.
Table 98: Correlation Table: Maximum Incentive and Number of Vehicles Retired
Correlation
Coefficient of
Group
Coefficient
Determination
%
Slope
Group 1: Worldwide Programs
(2009 - 2010)
0.42065868
0.17695372
17.7%
106.7
Group 2: California Programs (1990
- 2010)
0.45359418
0.20574768
20.6%
25.08
Group 3: U.S. State-Based
Programs (1992 - 2010)
0.88822989
0.78895234
78.9%
13.66
Group 4: Canadian Programs
(1996 - 2002)
0.87031408
0.75744659
75.7%
47.78
Group 5: Worldwide Program (1992
- 2000)
-0.12691684
0.01610789
1.6%
-41.65

All Groups

0.61263598

0.37532284

37.5%

88.02

Program Duration
Program duration was calculated by first finding the number of days between a
programs’ start and end date. The calculated number of days was then divided
by 31, the approximate average number of days in a given month. Duration
values represent the approximate number of months of a program’s tenure.
Several programs are ongoing. For an exact list of program dates, see Table 6.
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Table 99: Correlation Table: Program Duration and Total Number of Vehicles
Retired
Correlation
Coefficient of
Group
Coefficient
Determination
%
Slope
Group 1: Worldwide
Programs (2009 - 2010)
0.08778092
0.00770549
0.8%
6464.63
Group 2: California
Programs (1990 - 2010)
0.01174187
0.00013787
0.0%
5.66
Group 3: U.S. State-Based
Programs (1992 - 2010)
0.92343825
0.85273821
85.3%
1342.35
Group 4: Canadian
Programs (1996 - 2002)
-0.09206049
0.00847513
0.8%
-7.98
Group 5: Worldwide
Program (1992 - 2000)
-0.06242563
0.00389696
0.4%
-2500.39
All Groups
-0.13562891
0.01839520
1.8%
-1008.05

Minimum Vehicle Age Requirement
The minimum vehicle age requirement for a vehicle to be eligible for a given
program was not found for California’s Consumer Assistance Program,
Denmark, and the 1992 French program. Hungary, Italy’s 1997 and 1998 pro
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grams, and the California HEROS program based eligibility on other factors, and
were thus excluded.

Table 100: Correlation Table: Minimum Vehicle Age and Total Number of Vehicles Retired

Group
Group 1: Worldwide
Programs (2009 - 2010)
Group 2: California
Programs (1990 - 2010)
Group 3: U.S. State-Based
Programs (1992 - 2010)
Group 4: Canadian
Programs (1996 - 2002)
Group 5: Worldwide
Program (1992 - 2000)
All Groups

Correlation
Coefficient

Coefficient of
Determination

%

Slope

-0.25096514

0.06298350

6.3%

-52750.42903

-0.49639624

0.24640923

24.6%

-1044.859935

-0.91356090

0.83459351

83.5%

-13845.5

-0.90251464

0.81453267

81.5%

-2796.721311

0.23005221

0.05292402

5.3%

20204.77273

-0.23725438

0.05628964

5.6%

-47904.7066
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